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The recommendations presented in this report have been made by the Policy 
and Economic Research Unit of CSIRO Land and Water and do not 
necessarily represent the views of the SE Catchment Water Management 
Board. 
 
In accepting the final version of this report, the SE Catchment Water 
Management Board does not necessarily endorse any views or 
recommendations made in this report, either wholly or in part. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Water policy in the South East has just completed a period of review and 
revision. The result has been a pro-rata rollout of most of the unallocated 
water in the unconfined aquifer of five Prescribed Wells Areas.   With this roll-
out completed further development of these water resources is heavily 
dependent on the development of water trading arrangements.  Consistent 
with our terms of reference, this report seeks to  
•  Identify the issues currently restraining water trading; 
•  Develop/identify a range of processes for the establishment of an effective 
water market; 
•  Identify the critical success factors for water trading; and 
  Identify the experiences from elsewhere, which have proved to be 
unsuccessful or inappropriate for prudent resource management. 
Issues currently restraining water trading were identified through a series of 
focus group meetings with water users and holders of water rights, 
comparison of current practice with actual and planned practices elsewhere, 
and a series of workshops with Board and Government representatives. 
Recommendations in the report propose a range of processes for the 
establishment of an effective market and factors critical for success.  We 
have taken literally the Board’s implied request that we draw attention to and 
do not propose processes or arrangements that have proved unsuccessful 
elsewhere. 
The value of water in the South East 
Irrigation in the South East directly accounts for over $93 million in regional 
value added. As most of the water available for irrigation has now been 
allocated, increase in the value of production is dependent upon trading 
opportunities. Water trading gains can be expected to come from 
  Transferring holdings to areas where they can be used; 
  Increases in the efficiency of water use; 
  Trade to higher value uses; and 
  Elimination of the ￿shadow￿ effect. 
It is also possible to use trading arrangements to help the South East to keep 
water resource use within sustainable limits. 
Economic analysis suggests that it is not unreasonable to expect a 20% 
increase in water use efficiency on an irrigation farm using 1,000 ML per 
annum to produce an additional $164,000 per annum.  Elimination of a 
1,000 ML shadow in a valuable area could produce an extra $3,500,000 per 
annum in net benefits (See Appendix 1). 
The title to this report arises from a comment made to us during consultations 
in the South East.  The sense of all the meetings we held was that the Board 
should search for excellence in the management of the South East’s Water 
Resources.  Irrigators and land holders want an apolitical system that will 
serve them well - in perpetuity. ￿ They want a system that will not create more 
problems.  This report is written with this proposition in mind.   4
Should the South East move to the frontier of best practice? 
Our strong recommendation is that the Board avoids the mistakes that have 
been made by others and, building upon global experience, move to the 
frontier of best practice in the allocation of water rights. If the Board goes for 
world best practice, the South East will win - economically, socially and 
environmentally.  The alternative is to proceed incrementally, dealing with 
problems as they emerge.  Global and Australian experience suggests that 
this incremental approach never works in areas that are or, as a result of 
changes, become over allocated.  The general experience is that trading 
turns over allocation into over-use.  Economic and community values decline. 
We recommend that, as well as acting to improve trading arrangements, 
changes are made to ensure that trading improves and sustains water 
use in the South East.  (R1) 
South Australia already has impressive institutional and administrative 
arrangements for its water resources.  The step from where the Board is to 
the very forefront in the management of renewable natural resources requires 
•  Enabling water users to separate "access" rights (the site specific rules 
about how water may be used at any location) from "volumetric" 
entitlements so that trades in volume are not hindered by complex 
administrative procedures; 
•  Introduction of a simple volumetric accounting system and limiting trading 
opportunities to those people prepared to use this system; 
•  Deepening thin markets by ensuring good flow of information for each of 
the South East￿s 70 odd management areas; 
•  Through a competitive process, appointment of a preferred broker with a 
mandate and contract to develop each of these markets; 
•  Re-specification of existing rights as volumetric shares of the PAV for 
each management area. 
There is lots of detail behind this five-point strategy but, in essence, this is 
what we recommend.  We don’t recommend fiddling around the edges. 
This report 
The first question that this report asks is: "How do existing licence 
arrangements line up with world best practice?"   
Having highlighted opportunities for improvement, the report then focuses in 
on trading arrangements.  "How should the market be established?  
Recognising the power of imperfect markets to frustrate and hinder progress, 
the report also searches for property right and institutional arrangements so 
that trading will help the people of the South East achieve the goals they have 
set for their water resources.     5
Rights to South East groundwater 
The South East￿s water resources consist of a series of confined and 
unconfined aquifers divided administratively into 5 Prescribed Wells Areas.  
Prescribed Wells Areas are divided further into zones and management 
areas.  The borders of most, but not all, management areas coincide with the 
boundaries assigned to each hundred.   
Water rights, rules for water quality protection and trading arrangements are 
used for totally different purposes.  The rules for protecting water quality, in 
particular, work at cross purposes to the security of an individual￿s water 
rights and ease of trading arrangements.  Licence holders would prefer an 
absolute guarantee that none of the rules about access to water and the ways 
it can be used will change.  In reality, however, knowledge about aquifers and 
how they respond to use is far from perfect.  At times, this means that the 
rules and conditions under which people are allowed to use water need, at 
least periodically, to be changed.   Clearly there are competing objectives but 
the sustainable use of water requires that: 
1)  Water is allocated in a manner that does not result in depletion, by 
keeping use within Permissible Annual Volumes (PAV). 
2)   Increases in salinity be controlled in areas where irrigation and soil 
conditions are such that water quality, rather than water quantity, limits 
water potential. 
This latter purpose - the control of salinity - is not always well appreciated by 
irrigators.  The main cause of salinity is groundwater recycling. 
There will soon be 6 very different types of water allocation in the South East.  
Some are specified in volumetric terms and others by area. 
In each management area, the market is very thin.  There are approximately 
70 management areas.  Across the entire South East, the record number of 
applications to expand the area irrigated on a property is 254 and the record 
number of trades in any one year is 57. To September of this year (2000), 36 
trades have occurred.  The number of licence holders in each management 
area is typically around 20 to 40 and can be as low as 5. 
Opportunities to improve licence and allocation arrangements 
Experience from the rest of the world suggests that it is easier to set up 
systems that don￿t work than ones which do! The lessons that emerge from 
these experiences and this literature are summarised in Appendix 2.  Well-
designed systems avoid problems, poorly designed systems compound them. 
All tradeable property right systems, including those used to manage water, 
are based upon limits set by administrators.  If these limits are wrong, trading 
may result in changes that lead to social, economic and environmental 
catastrophes.  As a result, the foundations of a system must be well defined.  
Examples of problematic trading systems can be found in many of the world’s 
over-exploited fisheries and in a number of Australian groundwater based 
irrigation areas.  There are many other examples of failure and poorly   6
functioning systems. Typically, the systems that are worst are those that 
respond slowly but irreversibly to unsustainable pressures.  Groundwater 
systems fall into this category. 
The South East will benefit most by the development of water trading that is 
accompanied by the progressive introduction of institutional, administrative 
and legal arrangements that are consistent with world best practice.  Changes 
consistent with this vision include 
1)  Definition of entitlements so that it is clear that holders are given a 
proportional share of the PAV as climate, land-use and water availability 
change through time. 
2)  The development of a low cost debit and credit water accounting system. 
3)  Immediate introduction of meters in all areas that are over-allocated, rapid 
introduction of meters in all areas that are more than 80% allocated and 
phased introduction in areas that are more than 50% allocated. 
4)  Separation of volumetric allocations of PAV from site-specific access or 
use rights.  This could be achieved under the current Act by progressively 
issuing all holders of a Water (Taking) Allocation with  
a)  a Volumetric (Holding) Allocation indicating the share of the PAV 
held by them; 
b)  a Water (Taking) Allocation defining the maximum amount of water 
that can be "used" per annum on the land title described by the title 
and also the way that that water may be used. 
To use water as distinct from holding it, both a Water (Taking) Licence 
and Water (Holding) Licence would be necessary. 
5)  Making it clear that licensed "use" refers to the volume that transpires or 
evaporates and, whether flood irrigation or other similar system, is 
different from the volume that is pumped. 
Examples of the first page of these two types of allocation are presented on 
the following pages.  The CT on the first licence is code for the Certificate of 
Title to which it relates.  The formula for converting from irrigation equivalent 
to crop area ratio is not mentioned.  The second example is of a volumetric 
holding allocation.  No certificate of title is mentioned.   7
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Both types of allocation state that the Minister may vary the conditions 
attached to that licence annually. 
Metering 
It is recognised that many people are opposed to the introduction of meters.  
One of the main reasons for this is the fact that the difference between the 
water that is pumped and the water that is "used" has not been well 
communicated.  Global experience, however, is that un-metered systems are 
characterised by over-exploitation and economic decline.  As the State Water 
Plan says  "if you can’t measure it, you can’t manage it" (p.58).  We 
recommend 
•  immediate introduction of meters in all areas that are over-allocated; 
•  rapid introduction of meters in all areas that are more than 80% allocated; 
and  
•  phased introduction of meters in areas that are more than 50% allocated. 
The State Water Plan sets the date of 2005 for complete conversion of all 
allocations.  As part of this conversion process, irrigators will need to be given 
the flexibility to carry forward water from year to year.  To facilitate this and as 
an interim arrangement, we recommend that each licensee be allowed to 
carry forward up to one year’s allocation and that, on conversion, all area 
allocations be given one year’s allocation in advance.  People who wish to 
have access to more than this amount will need to acquire it via the trading 
market. 
Conversion from irrigation equivalents to volumetric allocations 
A major issue for the South East is to find the most equitable means to 
convert those parts of the existing allocation system that are still area based 
to volumetric or, if this direction is not followed, then how to convert the 
volumetric holdings into area-based allocations.  The central building blocks 
for the system are current definitions of the volume of water that is "used" by 
the reference crop for each zone.  As estimates of rates of evapo-
transpiration have been used to estimate consistency with the PAV for each 
area, we do not recommend recalculation of each licensee’s implied share of 
the PAV.  Any departure from this fundamental building block is likely to result 
in the simultaneous reduction of all other allocations in the area. 
A major issue for the Board to resolve is the confusion that exists in the South 
East about  
•  the difference between the volume pumped and volume used; and 
•  how these volumes relate to the crop area ratios used to define the area 
that may be irrigated. 
Under some flood irrigation systems, the volume pumped may be as much as 
4 times the volume that transpires, evaporates or is exported from the district.    10
Collectively, this is what is "used".  That which returns to the unconfined 
aquifer is available for re-use.   
Global experience indicates that communities will fight forever over the 
details.  The most successful systems are those that are built on sound 
conceptual foundations.   During the transition good systems all start by 
mimicking existing conditions as closely as possible.  Trading and periodic 
reviews are then used to phase in the new set of arrangements.  Given this, 
we recommend that any person wishing to trade an area allocation or expand 
an area allocation have the volumetric "use" defined by multiplying the 
irrigation area estimate by the current estimate of "use" per hectare for the 
reference crop.  Management plans should then stipulate the assumed 
Pump- to-Use-Coefficient that is assumed for each crop and type of irrigation. 
Take, for example, the case of a person who holds a 21 ha of irrigation 
equivalents and is using this to irrigate Sub-clover seed in Zone 3 of the 
Lacepede-Kongorong Prescribed Wells Area.  The assumed rate of 
evaporation and, hence, use from this crop is 4.93 ML per hectare so the 
volumetric allocation would be  
21 hectares times 4.93 ML = 103.53 ML 
This is the amount that would be tradeable.  That which may be pumped, 
however, could be quite different from this.  The crop area ratio for Sub-clover 
seed in Zone 3 is 2.7.  This, however, is not the number that is needed.  What 
is needed is a set of Pump-To-Use-Coefficients (PTUCs)1 that facilitate 
estimation of the volume that may be pumped for a reference crop and for the 
crop that is grown.  The PTUC for the reference crop may, for example, be 
4.0 and for Sub-clover seed be 5.2 or 3.8.  In the first instance, we suggest 
that the PTUC set for each crop should be set as close as possible to current 
practice.  Each management plan should then provide for the periodic review 
of each PTUC.  Where significant errors exist, the plan could provide for a 
gradual transition that brings the PTUC in line with reality.  
The recharge issue 
World best practice suggests that it is critical to use well-established scientific 
principles to estimate the quantity of water available in an area for 
consumptive use.  In the South East, this estimate is published as a 
Permissible Annual Volume.  World best practice suggests that the sum of all 
allocations should never be allowed to exceed the PAV set for any area.  This 
means that, whenever a change in land-use significantly reduces recharge by, 
for example, planting a forest or high water using perennial plant, an 
adjustment to the PAV must be made. 
                                            
1   Other names are possible.  It is the concept of that is important.   11
The options available are to include either all forms of land-use in the 
estimation of PAV, draw an arbitrary line or adjust the PAV and extent of 
irrigation as land-use changes.  We recommend the latter, more 
administratively simple, approach. Rather than issuing significant recharge 
effect allocations, land-use change approvals that are likely to significantly 
reduce recharge should be made conditional upon surrender of an allocation 
equivalent to the expected effect on this change on the aquifer and 
modification of the PAV for the relevant management area.  
When a person plans to significantly increase recharge and they register their 
intent to do so, they should be able to apply for a new water holding in 
proportion to the increase in PAV that their action creates. 
Trading arrangements 
Irrespective of whether or not any or all of the above opportunities are taken, 
there is an opportunity to significantly improve the market for water in the 
South East.  
Irrigation contributes around $93milllion per annum in the form of value added 
in the region.  Wise trading arrangements offer the opportunity to significantly 
increase this contribution without creating new problems.  Increases in value 
added as a result of a trade can exceed $4,000 per hectare (See Appendix 
One).  By way of example, a 20% improvement in the efficiency of water use 
by a potato grower using 1,000 ML per annum and the use of this saving to 
produce lucerne seed would increase the annual value of production by 
$164,000. 
As the market is thinly spread across 70 management areas and the volume 
of trades per year are likely to remain small, we recommend that a process be 
run to select a preferred broker for the South East.  This broker should be 
commissioned to provide an internet trading site and associated trading 
service for the South East for a period of 5 years.  The Board should not set 
up its own trading company.  We perceive it to be more cost effective to 
acquire the necessary software and trading skills from an outside provider.  It 
is also wise for the Board to avoid any accusations of conflict of interest.  
During the short-listing process, the Board should explore the merits of using 
this broker to communicate trading opportunities to irrigators and those with 
water (Holding) allocations.  Many of these people are not familiar with water 
trading opportunities and there may be many misunderstandings.  After the 
first five years and, as the market should be well established, it may not be 
necessary to continue with a preferred broker arrangement. 
As the market develops, the Board, in conjunction with other Catchment 
Boards in the State, could encourage the brokers to work towards setting up 
professional accreditation processes to ensure accountability of brokers and 
agents in water trading.  It is advisable for the Board to remain at ￿arm￿s 
length￿ from these processes.   12
Making the market work efficiently, equitably and dependably 
The water market in most parts of the South East is likely to remain "thin".  
That is, the number of transactions that occur in any management area is 
likely to be relatively small.  In such situations, administrators need to search 
for arrangements that make the market deeper. 
One of the most effective ways of doing this is to focus on the incentive for 
people to trade and to lease or sell unused water allocations.  As a general 
rule, there will be more trades if 
•  the broking fee is low (achieved by commissioning a preferred broker); 
•  information about prices is freely available (achieved by establishing and 
publicising market trends, allowing people to search a central register of 
transactions, etc); 
•  anonymous lists of water available for sale is easily available (achieved by 
selecting a preferred broker and requiring provision of an internet site, 
etc); 
•  application fees are low and approvals rapid (achieved by adopting 
processes that simplify administration); 
•  it is possible to get prior approval to use water at a location ( achieved by 
separating holding allocations from access issues so that people can get 
approval to irrigate before they search for the water to use); 
•  the trading areas are large (achieved by allowing trial trading across 
management area borders and following separation of holding and taking 
allocations, searching for opportunities to combine management areas); 
•  low cost temporary trades are possible with immediate approval (achieved 
by separating  holding and taking allocations, introducing meters and 
setting up a water accounting system); 
•  borrowing from future allocations is discouraged (achieved by setting a 
100% penalty for borrowing water from next year’s allocation - in effect the 
rule is if you take 10 ML from next year’s allocation rather than buying it 
you lose 20 ML off the top of next year’s allocation); 
In addition, the Board and the Government need to consider how best to 
allocate water in those parts of the South East where the roll out has not been 
completed.  We suggest that this water should remain unallocated until 
trading is well established and then used to deepen the market for water.  
Deepening the market and lowering transaction costs 
One of the most innovative opportunities to make thin markets work 
effectively is to introduce a zero-revenue auction process.  We recommend 
that the Water Resources Act be amended to allow any hundred or 
management area to introduce an annual zero-revenue process if more than 
two thirds of irrigators support the idea.  Under this mechanism, 10% of each   13
holding would be offered for sale via a mechanism where the expected 
clearing prices would be publicised for a week and reserve prices changed in 
light of this information.  Water holders should be encouraged to add 
additional water to zero-revenue auction. 
With regard to fee and levy arrangements, we observe that, if PAVs are set 
and periodically reviewed, if allocations to the environment are appropriate, 
and if Significant Recharge Effect Allocation arrangements are in place; then 
a catchment levy applied to all water holdings in proportion to the volume 
held, will encourage trade and economic development.  A case can also be 
made for a separate levy in proportion to land value or land area as some of 
the Board’s costs relate more to these measures than the volume of water. 
During our consultations, a number of people suggested that a higher levy 
should be applied to those people who do not offer water for trade.  If a water 
accounting system is in place, the economic incentive to trade should be 
sufficient.  If water is not trading, this is probably due to either a lack of 
demand or an impediment in the trading system.  Introduction of low cost 
ways to trade water rather than introduction of tradeable levies is the way to 
go. 
The settlement system 
One of the problems that plague the introduction of any tradeable property 
right system is the need to move a complex paper trail of records into a formal 
property register.  South Australia, the home of the Torrens Title registration 
system, is a world leader in the development of such systems.  Under the 
Torrens Title system, titles are registered centrally and any dealing associated 
with these titles is valid only when the dealing is recorded on that central 
register.  The Department is moving towards such as system but it is not yet 
fully in place.  At present, there is considerable mis-match between the 
procedures used to buy and sell land and those used to buy and sell 
permanent water.  It is only a matter of time until a serious error is made or a 
person rorts the system.  In consultation with other Boards, we recommend 
that dealing and settlement arrangements for all trades associated with 
permanent water trading be made consistent with established conveyancing 
practices as quickly as possible. 
Temporary trades, as they are called, will be most effectively managed via the 
introduction of water accounts that resemble the statements used by all 
Australian banks. 
Implementation 
The recommendations, options and suggestions made in this report propose 
a framework that aims to keep the South East in front and leave it with a 
water resource legacy of water resource allocation, management and trading 
decisions that it can be proud of.  It assumes that the South East wishes to 
prosper, wishes to manage its water resources sustainably and does not want 
to trade into problems.  The last section in this report lists a set of decisions 
that  
•  can be taken by the Board;   14
•  require consultation with the other Boards; 
•  require administrative changes at Departmental level; and 
•  require or could be more effectively implemented if supported by 
amendment of the Water Resources Act. 
The report closes with a suggestion that the South East be used as the 
platform to improve water trading arrangements across the State.   15
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS  
This report recommends that 
As well as acting to improve trading arrangements, changes are made to 
ensure that trading improves and sustains water use in the South East.  (R1) 
This report’s recommendations and guidelines for the improved licensing and 
management of water resources in the South East apply equally to the 
confined aquifer, as they do to the unconfined aquifer.  In the long run, the 
Board should expect that confined water, as well as unconfined water, will be 
traded.  (R2) 
To build a solid foundation for successful trading, this report 
recommends that  
The Board pursues opportunities to convert existing licences into tradeable 
shares.  (R3) 
To facilitate trade and, in particular, conversion from one crop to another, or 
from one form of irrigation technology to another, a set of Pump-To-Use-
Coefficients (PTUCs) are necessary.   These coefficients should indicate the 
difference between what is pumped and what is used.  Under some flood 
irrigation systems, as much as 4 times the amount that either transpired or 
evaporates is pumped.  (R4) 
Policies be put in place to ensure that trading arrangements retain 
consistency with the PAV set for each area evolve and change through time.  
The definitions of allocations should recognise that PAVs.  (R5)  
If the Board, in consultation with the State Government, opts to define 
allocations as proportional shares of the PAV associated with each aquifer, 
we recommend finding a simple straightforward means of calculating each 
person￿s share. As a basis for discussion, it is suggested that each person’s 
share could be defined as the quantity of water assumed to either transpire or 
evaporate from the reference crop.  If this option is taken then the sum of 
allocations should retain consistency with the PAV.  Most other models will 
require a subsequent pro-rata adjustment to once again make the sum of all 
allocations consistent with the PAV.  (R6) 
To increase the extent of opportunities to improve water use 
Policies and management plans allow and encourage people to allow 
separation of volumetric entitlements from access for ￿use￿ entitlements, so 
that these rights can be sold or leased to separate people.  (R7) 
To prevent people from capriciously acting to create a shadow over another 
person’s holding, all new access licences contain a condition that will result in 
the forfeiture that shadowing opportunity if it has not been used for four years.  
This should not extend to the volumetric allocation attached to a licence, only 
the right to use that volume at a specific location.  (R8)   16
To prevent trading resulting in the over-use of water, we recommend 
that 
As it is State policy that all bores should be metered before 2005, no trades 
be allowed to or from farms that are not metered.  That is, any person who 
wishes to expand the area they irrigate, or any person wishing to acquire 
water from another person, be allowed to use that water only if they first 
convert their allocation to a volumetric one.  (R9) 
Upon conversion to a volumetric, each holder of a Water (Taking) Licence be 
allocated one year’s allocation and that as an interim strategy the maximum 
amount that may be carried forward from year to year be one year’s 
allocation.  (R10) 
The penalty for over-pumping, that is pumping without an allocation, be 
double the amount that is pumped in excess of the allocation held.  
Consistent with this model, people with a volumetric holding licence should be 
allowed to carry forward up to one year’s allocation.  (R11) 
To allow and keep the administrative cost of annual volumetric trades 
low, this report recommends 
A simple bank-like accounting system be established for the South East’s 
water resources so that low-cost volumetric trading arrangements can occur 
quickly and simply.  (R12) 
Land-use change approvals that are likely to significantly reduce recharge 
should be made conditional upon surrender of an allocation equivalent to the 
expected effect on this change on the aquifer and modification of the PAV for 
the relevant management area. Conversely, when a person plans to 
significantly increase recharge and they register their intent to do so, they 
should be able to apply for a new water holding in proportion to the increase 
in PAV that their action creates.  (R13) 
To facilitate the development of an informed efficient market, this report 
recommends that  
A process be run to select a preferred broker to provide an internet site and 
associated trading service for the South East for a period of 5 years.  (R14)   
During the short listing process when a preferred broker is selected, the 
Board explore the merits of contracting the preferred broker to communicate 
trading opportunities to irrigators and those with water holding licences. In 
partnership with the preferred broker, the Board could prepare an information 
booklet on trading opportunities, processes and arrangements.  (R15) 
As the market develops, the Board, in conjunction with other Boards in South 
Australia, encourage brokers to develop a process of accreditation in a 
manner similar to the real estate industry.  Ideally, all brokers would need to 
demonstrate knowledge, carry liability insurance and adhere to a professional 
code of practice.  (R16)   17
No unallocated water be released until a strong, viable market is established.  
On a management area by management area basis and as an interim 
strategy, unallocated water could be used to deepen the market for water by 
offering it for sale on an annual basis.  (R17). 
The Water Resources Act be amended to allow any hundred or management 
area, to introduce an annual zero-revenue process, if more than two thirds of 
irrigators support the idea.  Under this mechanism, 10% of each holding 
would be offered for sale via a mechanism where the expected clearing prices 
would be publicised for a week, and reserve prices changed in light of this 
information.  Water holders should be encouraged to add additional water to 
zero-revenue auction (R18).  
A review be conducted to select some areas where cross-border trading is 
allowed on a trial basis.  Cross-border trading may be more feasible if access 
or use rights are separated from volumetric allocations.  (R19) 
Fee and levy arrangements be reviewed once decisions about other 
recommendations in this report have been made.  Trading fees and levies be 
aligned with administrative costs and kept as low as possible.  The transfer of 
a volume or holding should cost much less than the transfer of an access 
right as only the latter requires a hydrological assessment.  (R20) 
Dealing and settlement arrangements for all dealings associated with 
permanent water trading, be made consistent with land title trades as quickly 
as possible.  (R21)   18
To allow trading arrangements to be varied in accordance with local 
arrangements, this report recommends that 
Management plans be used as the main mechanism to define the rules and 
conditions under which trades are allowed.  (R22) 
From a trading perspective, management plans should: 
a.  Identify where cross-management area border trading may be trialed and 
how the impacts of these trials should be monitored; 
b.  Document interim PTUC and propose a process for their revision; 
c.  Define annual PAV and, where appropriate2, set in place a transitional 
arrangement to bring the sum of allocations in line with the PAV 
d.  Set maximum and minimum depth to groundwater levels, salinity 
concentrations, etc that if exceeded would trigger a review 
e.  Define access rules including the factors to be considered when applying 
the "4 kilometre square test"; 
f.  Define the show cause rules that would apply to people whose licences 
are creating a shadow on the water use opportunities available to others; 
g.  Define the maximum amount of water that may be carried forward from 
year to year; 
h.  Set a time frame for the roll-out of meters; (R23) 
To facilitate the efficient development of water trading arrangements 
and maintain South Australia’s position as a world leader in water 
resources management, this report recommends 
The South East be used as the place to develop, test and refine water trading 
arrangements in South Australia.  (R24) 
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Our terms of reference required us to specifically consider the social and 
economic impacts of water trading in South East.  Water trading is already 
occurring in the South East and Melissa Bright’ s analysis of the implications 
of alternative scenarios gave us an invaluable set of insights into the range of 
issues to be considered. 
To ensure that we understood the full range of issues faced by the Board, we 
began with a series of workshops and focus group meetings with landholders 
in the South East.  Meetings with irrigators and non-irrigators at Mount 
Gambier, Naracoorte and Keith were very constructive and rich in 
observation.  We owe a considerable debt to these people.  They challenged 
us considerably, understood all the issues, and stressed the need for decision 
and for a set of trading arrangements that will increase the prosperity and 
ensure that these arrangements improve rather than detract from the 
environment. 
As part of the above process, we also met with the Board to scope 
alternatives and held a series of challenging workshops with staff employed 
by the Board and the Department of Water Resources.  Randy Stringer, from 
the Centre for International Economics also participated in all our discussions 
and made many valuable contributions that we would like to acknowledge.  It 
has been a joy and pleasure to work with all of these people.  Responsibility 
for statements and judgements made in this report, however, must remain 
with us. 
Finally, we would like to acknowledge and thank Jenny Peterson from the 
South East Catchment Water Management Board Staff.  She tracked down a 
great deal of information for us and met our many requests with enthusiasm.   20
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PART ONE:  WHY BOTHER WITH TRADE? 
The State of Affairs in the South East 
Water policy in the South East has just completed a period of review and 
revision. The result has been a pro-rata rollout of most of the unallocated 
water in the unconfined aquifer of five Prescribed Wells Areas.    
A new era in water resource management has arrived.  Although small 
amounts of water remain unallocated in a few management areas, most 
water in the unconfined aquifer is fully allocated and, if current estimates are 
correct, a number of areas are already over-allocated.3 
From now on, most growth, development and change in water use will 
necessarily be accompanied by trading in water rights, allocations and 
holdings.  To assist this transition, the South East Catchment Water 
Management Board commissioned this report to identify the most effective 
way to improve trading arrangements.  The report identifies opportunities at 
the State and Board level.  
In the South East, water drives options for economic development in 
agriculture and also other key industries like forestry, tourism, paper 
manufacturing and food processing.  Water trading represents an opportunity 
to expand higher value uses of water and to do so in ways that neither result 
in declines in water quality or future opportunity.  In agriculture, this might 
mean converting a dryland pasture to an  irrigated pasture, or horticulture and 
viticulture.  Where the location of irrigation changes, trade in water holdings 
and/or allocations is necessary.   
As demand for water increases, holders of water allocations will review their 
options and ask questions about the way they earn money and use water.  In 
this new water era, they may choose to continue doing things the same way, 
move into higher value crops or sell/lease any surplus water.   
A key feature that drives the framework for this report is recognition that the 
South East’s water resources are groundwater, rather than surface water 
based.  Groundwater systems change slowly and are difficult to monitor. This 
means that mistakes take time to reveal themselves.  Permanent changes in 
recharge rates are not easily separated from weather induced fluctuations.  
Water quality problems move laterally at rates that range typically from 100 
to 300 metres per year.  A neighbour may not become aware of the fact that 
an aquifer has become contaminated for many years.  Moreover, once they 
emerge, these problems are not easily rectified.  In short, unless close 
attention is paid to the fundamentals, the South East could trade itself into a 
set of unresolvable environmental, economic and social disasters.   
                                            
3   The Lacepede Kongorong Prescribed Area is the only area where significant amounts 
of water are expected to remain unallocated.   24
Socio-Economic Gains of Trade or ￿What￿s at Stake?￿ 
So let￿s get to the question at hand ￿ what￿s at stake?  Why not just let things 
continue the way they are.  Future environmental, economic and social 
development of the region is what is at stake.   Fundamental to this is how 
individuals use their limited resources to satisfy their unlimited wants without 
causing problems for others.   
Water is important for not only the individual but also the regional economy.  
The better water is managed, the healthier the local economy will be and the 
better its environment will be.  
Within the South East’s regional economy, water markets are going to be one 
of the main mechanisms used to allocate scarce resources among competing 
uses and users. They are also going to be one of the main mechanisms used 
to protect the region’s environment.  Each time a trade occurs, there is an 
opportunity to compound or reduce existing problems. 
Water use in the South East is capped for two reasons.  The first reason is 
simply to prevent aquifer depletion.  As the aquifer drops, the costs of ground 
water pumping rises.  As well, water levels need to remain high enough that 
local wetlands, sink holes, river systems etc are maintained.  The second - 
less appreciated reason - is that controls on irrigation are used to prevent 
declines in water quality.  Salinity and nutrient contamination are the two main 
problems.  When an area of land is irrigated, some of the water evaporates or 
transpires, but the salt and many of the nutrients return back to the aquifer.  
Each time the exercise is repeated, water quality declines.  Long-term, 
economic development depends on good quality water.  While there is some 
experimentation with salt resistant crops and research into potential uses of 
saline water, many of these options are unlikely to deliver the economic 
returns of current agricultural practices. 
In the short term, the only way for many enterprises to expand production or 
get into more intensive water use is to buy water.  Under the new regime, 
nearly all rights to use water have been allocated to landholders.  This means 
that a trade will precede many changes in water use.  The trade can be 
expected to occur when an aspiring buyer can use the water more profitably 
than the seller can.  This is where the gains from trade emerge. 
The gains from water trade can be categorised into two groups - those 
benefits that accrue directly to the user of the water, and those that are 
captured by the wider community.  
The expanding water trade will involve such things as: 
•  movement of water from application to crops that produce more profit per 
hectare and industries that produce more dollars per megalitre of water 
used; 
•  increased economic development activity and/or employment; 
•  improved water use efficiency.   25
Expanding water trade has to be undertaken in a manner that does not 
significantly diminish the second category of benefits, which includes option 
and existence values that accrue to individuals and society.  Option values 
relate to the fact that people want the resource, i.e. underground water, to be 
there for future generations.  Existence (intrinsic) value is the value 
associated with knowing a resource is there for its own sake (i.e. satisfaction 
in the fact that the South East has healthy water). These are benefits 
associated with sustainability and in some cases with the private benefits 
listed above.  The individual does not always act in ways that ensure the 
sustainability of the resource.  
There is a third category of benefits that includes the indirect benefits that 
accrue to the region such as the spin-off benefits of job creation and the 
expansion of services in the region.  These indirect benefits can be short term 
if the resource is not managed sustainably.  
Trade forces a review of the property rights structure.  By separating the title 
to land and water, trade is facilitated.  Informal markets for water will develop 
if there is scarcity and a growing demand for water, despite legal 
impediments, as experience in Pakistan and India suggests.  Trade has a 
tendency to put pressure on groundwater and surface water systems and as 
a result great care is required to ensure that the fundamentals are set up 
correctly.  As technology changes and trades occur over time, further review 
and refinements may be required. 
The potential gains from these trading opportunities are significant.  As 
detailed in Appendix One, gross margins for high value uses, like viticulture, 
are in the vicinity of $4,000 per ML while those for irrigated pasture range 
between $140 and $750 per ML.  This means that trading can increase 
regional income by more than $2,000 per ML.   26
PART TWO: THE CURRENT SYSTEM 
Types of Allocations 
With the pro-rata rollout there are, at least, three types of water allocation in 
the South East. They are 
1.  Water licences with a holding allocation defined as a right to a 
volume of water available in a hundred or management area.  These 
allocations are not attached to a specific certificate of title and do not 
entitle the holder to use the water without first obtaining a taking 
allocation.  The Select Committee, in recommending the roll out of un-
allocated water, suggested that these allocations should be allocated 
as a proportional "share of the available water resource" but, departing 
from emerging best global practice, recommended that they be issued 
as "a kilolitre volume." 
2.  Water licences with an area taking allocation defined as a right to 
irrigate a specified area described by a certificate of title.  The area is 
defined in irrigation equivalents and is converted to an actual crop area 
using crop area ratios that vary from Prescribed Wells Area to 
Prescribed Wells Area. 
3.  Water licences with a mobile area taking allocation defined as a 
right to irrigate an area of land in a water management area or 
hundred. The area is defined in irrigation equivalents and is converted 
to an actual crop area using crop area ratios that vary from Prescribed 
Wells Area to Prescribed Wells Area. 
As a result of the pro-rata rollout, and as a matter of policy, it is envisaged 
that any conversion of a holding allocation will be in volumetric terms.  Thus, 
in the very near future, the water rights in the South East will also be defined 
by  
4.  Water licences with a volumetric taking allocation defined as a 
right to use a volume of water per year at a location defined by a 
certificate of title.4 
5.  Water licences with a mobile volumetric taking allocation defined 
as a right to apply a specified volume of water to an area of land in a 
water management area or hundred. 
Consideration is being given to requiring changes in land use that significantly 
affect the rate of groundwater recharge to be licensed. Allocations of this form 
could be used to give people credit for increasing the rate of groundwater 
recharge by removing a forest or introducing an aquifer storage and recovery 
program.  Conversely, they could be used to facilitate the introduction of 
mechanisms that force any change in land-use change, that reduces the rate 
                                            
4   A small number of volumetric water rights existed prior to the pro-rata roll out.  These 
are primarily for industrial purposes.   27
of aquifer recharge, to be off-set by a reduction in the volume of water used 
for irrigation.  For the purposes of this report, we refer to this form of 
allocation as a Significant Recharge Effect Allocation. 
6.  Significant recharge effect allocation defined as a right to affect 
significantly the rate of recharge in an area by, for example, 
establishing a new plantation.5  
These subtle differences among each type of allocation makes comparison of 
them difficult.  To aid comparison, Table 1 draws attention to the key features 
of each type of allocation.  In the process of doing this, and for this report, we 
also assign abbreviated names to each type of allocation.  In the near future, 
trade among all of these six forms of allocation can be expected.  Unless 
arrangements are put in place to free up the water now in Volumetric Holding 
Allocations, opportunities for economic growth through irrigation will be 
limited. 
To understand water licensing arrangements in the South East, it is 
necessary also to understand two other considerations.  First, while most 
water use is supplied from unconfined aquifers, a smaller amount is supplied 
from confined aquifers.  As all confined aquifers are only partially developed, 
and the water in them reserved primarily for urban and industrial purposes, 
there is less opportunity for trading among these allocations.  This report’s 
recommendations and guidelines for the improved licensing and 
management of water resources in the South East apply equally to the 
confined aquifer, as they do to the unconfined aquifer.  In the long run, 
the Board should expect that confined water, as well as unconfined 
water, will be traded.  (R2) 
Second, water use in the 20 kilometre strip on either side of the South 
Australian and Victorian border is subject to conditions set out in the Border 
(Groundwater Agreement) Act 1985.  For management purposes this area is 
divided into 11 zones on either side of the Border, 8 of which are under the 
jurisdiction of the South East Catchment Water Management Board. 
                                            
5   Elsewhere in this report we propose a more cost effective and administratively simple 
way of dealing with this issue.   28
Table 1  Summary of existing and expected water allocation 
arrangements in the South East of South Australia  
(Assuming that none of the recommendations in this report are accepted.) 
 
Allocation Type  Volume that may 
be "used" * 







Up to the volume 
stated.  
None.  Can be used within 
the Water 
Management Area if 
converted to a 




All that is needed to 
grow a specified 
crop area. 
Grow nominated 
crop up to the 
irrigation equivalent 
stated multiplied by 
the crop area ratio. 
Location described 
by the certificate of 
title. Transferable 





Up to the volume 
stated. 










All that is needed to 
grow a specified 
crop area. 
Grow nominated 
crop up to the 
irrigation equivalent 
stated multiplied by 
the crop area ratio. 
Management Area. 
{These allocations 
may be taken from 
another location, 
perhaps even in 
another 
management area, 
for a short time.}  
Volumetric (Mobile) 
Taking Allocation 
Up to the volume 
stated. 
Pump water up to x 











Maximum limit on 
extent of change in 
recharge.  
Conceptually, 
credits are possible. 
Change vegetation 
over an area 
defined by the 
recharge equivalent 
by change in 
recharge. 
Area described by 
the certificate of 




*  As explained elsewhere, some flood irrigators are under the misunderstanding that 
conversion to volumetric systems will not take account of the fact that much of the water 
pumped returns to the aquifer.  In this report, "use" refers to the quantity that is permanently 
removed from the aquifer by evaporation, transpiration or export..   29
Recent Trading Experience 
Figure 1 and Table 2 below summarise the extent of recent trading and 
expansions in the extent of irrigation across the South East.  Under current 
rules, any increase in the area irrigated or any trade requires a 
hydrogeological assessment.  In any single area, the number of trades is very 
small. 
Figure 1  Summary of the number of trades and application to expand 
irrigation in the South East 


























Table 2  Number of applications to trade water in the South East  
 
Year  No. Applications to expand 
irrigated area 




1991 29  0  29 
1992 47  0  47 
1993 38  0  38 
1994 61  3  64 
1995 51  20  71 
1996 36  18  54 
1997 254  31  285 
1998 95  57 152 
1999 66  24  90 
2000 17  19  36 
Total 694  172 866 
Source: Fred Stadter, Dept for Water Resources, Naracoorte   30
What trades are possible under the current regime? 
Under existing arrangements, and as summarised in Figure 1, trade among 
all the forms of allocation in Table 1 can be expected.  Current policy requires 
a hydrogeological assessment for any trade involving a Water (Taking) 
Allocation, including conversion from a Water (Holding) Allocation to a taking 
allocation.  There is a notable exception, a hydrogeological assessment is not 
required when the water rights are sold with the land.   
Figure 2  Types of trades expected over the next 10 years under 
existing legislative and administrative arrangements.  The 
thick blue lines indicate trades that require hydrogeological 
assessment before approval.  Other permutations are possible 
but policy indications are that most of these other 
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The first step in the hydrogeological assessment is a desk assessment based 
on information held within the Department.  Field assessments may be 
required in some circumstances.  
                                            
6   The State Water Plan makes it clear that within five years all groundwater irrigation 
should be metered.    31
During a hydrogeological assessment, a "4 kilometre square test" is applied to 
any unconfined aquifer trade.  The test is a pragmatic tool for protecting 
aquifer quality, impacts on nearby landholders and the environment.  One 
consequence of this policy is that any taking allocation casts a ￿shadow￿ over 
a 16 square kilometre area.  Generally, the presence of one allocation, limits 
the range of opportunities available to others within the "shadow".   In the 
past, the cost of conducting the 4 kilometre square test has been met by the 
Department for Water Resources.  When the test results in a refusal of 
permission, the applicant may, at their own expense, commission a more 
comprehensive assessment of the likely hydrogeological consequences of the 
proposed trade. 
A second major consideration is the area within which trades are possible.  
Under current arrangements, trading is only possible within a hundred, or 
within a management area or sub-area.  In the most restrictive case, this 
means that the total number of allocations within any trading regime is five.  In 
virtually all cases, the number is less than 100 allocations. 
Another consideration is the fact that both permanent and temporary trades 
can be expected.  Under current arrangements, temporary trades can be 
expected to occur via the lease of an allocation to another person.7 If, as 
proposed in the State Water Plan, meters are installed, a temporary trade 
could take the form of a transfer of an actual volume of water to a third 
person.  Leasing of water to third parties could create a situation where there 
are shadows over large areas where no irrigation is occurring. 
Across the South East, a few towns and a few industries have access to 
water in the confined aquifers that sit below the unconfined aquifer.  
Opportunities to trade these allocations are few, as most of this water is 
reserved for urban, industrial and recreational purposes.  This means that, in 
the short term, the information provided in this report is most relevant to the 
users of the unconfined aquifer.8 
                                            
7   Administratively, this is achieved by amending the allocation on the licence that the 
water is traded from and increasing the allocation on the other one.  These amendments 
stipulate the period of time for which this change remains in place. 
8    There are two main types of recreational water users: golf courses and sporting 
fields.  Golf courses are a profitable enterprise and thus it should be possible for the owners of 
the golf courses to buy water on the market.  Sporting fields may not be profitable outside 
major urban areas and there may be public amenity reasons for providing water for these 
fields.  Some choices are available: 
•  take water from the confined aquifer,  
•  require the local governments operating these fields to purchase the water through tax 
revenues, or 
•  make an exception for non-profit enterprises in the allocation of resources and wait for the 
line-up of exceptional cases.   
If a special provision is made for recreational use outside the market, then it will be necessary 
to put rules in place to prevent this water from being traded.    32
PART THREE:  THE NUTS AND BOLTS OF DESIGNING SYSTEMS 
Our advice, in this part of the report, is based on the premise that the South 
East is interested in: 
•  diversified economic development; 
•  supports sustainable use of the resource; and 
•  would prefer people to be able to make decisions in an environment 
with access to information and not be tied up in unnecessary red tape. 
Everything we learned in the workshop and focus group meetings supports 
these basic premises. 
Organising Principles 
The following is a set of principles that are useful in organising ideas about 
the competing goals inherent in designing the mechanics of a property rights 
system.  It is extremely important in designing a system to keep track of why 
each policy is being put in place, and identify the reasons why it is being 
introduced.  The recommendations in this report are based on the assumption 
that the Board is interested in developing policies and programs that pursue: 
•  Environmental protection/improvement ￿ the trading system should not 
result in any backsliding in terms of environmental standards. 
•  Productive and allocative efficiency ￿ trading encourages water resources 
to be assigned to their most valuable use and to be applied efficiently.  
•  Low information requirements ￿ information requirements should be kept 
to a minimum ￿ often this means asking: "What do administrators really 
need to know?" 
•  Low administrative costs ￿ the cost of setting up, enforcing and reviewing 
the system should be kept low.  Simplicity is often the key. 
•  Equity ￿ no group should be severely disadvantaged by the trading system 
and it should not allow individuals to hold others to ransom. 
•  Adaptability ￿ the system should be able to adapt easily to changing 
technology, prices and climatic conditions. 
•  Dependability ￿ the system should keep use within sustainable limits as 
they are redefined through time, even when information about the likely 
responses is uncertain. 
•  Continuing incentives ￿ resource users should have an incentive to 
exceed targets including environmental standards and efficiency of 
resource use.   33
•  Permanence ￿ the trading and allocation system should not be vulnerable 
to erratic or sudden changes.9 
World Best Practice 
Appendix 2 contains a summary of global experiences with the introduction of 
trading to a variety of resource allocation systems. Many of the features of 
world best practice are already being implemented in South Australia.  "World 
Best Practice" is characterised by: 
•  Security to promote investment in the form of a perpetual right or a 
guaranteed right.  Without security, resource users will not have incentive 
to invest in long term technologies or the incentives ￿to do the right thing￿ 
and exceed environmental standards 
•  A structure that recognises that the amount of water available for 
consumptive use is likely to change through time as social values, 
climates, technology, etc change.  Essentially, this means that the right 
should be specified as a share of the water available for consumptive use, 
not a volumetric guarantee.  Systems that guarantee a volume are not 
dependable as the political and administrative costs of amending each 
licence is considerable. 
•  Clear separation of the right to receive an allocation from the access 
conditions under which this allocation is used.  This substantially lowers 
transaction and administrative costs. 
•  An adaptive structure that ensures that water trading will not result in 
declines in water quality and other forms of degradation (essentially no 
unintended backsliding in environmental quality). 
•  Doing everything possible to increase the size, depth and scope of the 
market.  Information about prices and opportunities to trade should be 
available widely, but in an anonymous manner. 
•  Giving maximum opportunity for people in local areas to trial alternative 
arrangements and empower them to make collective decisions.  In this 
way, no one group is likely to be severely disadvantaged. 
As demonstrated so vividly in the Namoi Valley in NSW, the limits to aquifer 
use are often set by people who do not have access to perfect knowledge 
about an aquifer’s potential.  If the limits are not conservative enough then the 
result can be a social, political, environmental and economic disaster.  
Conversely, trading arrangements offer the best opportunity for communities 
to manage their way out of such problems and to keep out of them.  
What follows is a discussion of how water trading arrangements could 
relatively easily be improved in the South East.  If these changes in policy and 
                                            
9   Adapted from M.D. Young (1992).  Sustainable Investment and Resource Use:  
Equity, Environmental Integrity and Economic Efficiency.    34
administrative arrangements are made then, in our judgement, the South 
East’s environment, its natural resources, its economy and its people would 
be much better off.  Moreover, as time progresses, water trading 
arrangements will come to be valued as the glue that keeps the South East 
as a leading region. 
Opportunity One:  Design the licensing system so that the sum of 
allocations is always less than the PAV 
Some tough choices lie ahead ￿ to protect the environment in fully and over-
allocated areas it may be necessary to reduce current allocations to ensure 
long term sustainability.  The problem is ￿whose allocations￿ should be 
reduced.  For the purposes of discussion, let￿s use a figure of 20% as being 
the proportion that must be cut back. 
A reasonable question to ask is: can a trading system help keep water use 
within sustainable limits?  In the South East, the sustainable limit is defined in 
each region as a Permissible Annual Volume (PAV).  The science that 
underpins estimates of these volumes has been made on the basis of limited 
data.  As discussed with focus groups of irrigators, it￿s likely that current 
permissible annual volumes are imprecise and even if they are right, the only 
thing known for certain is that as climate changes occur, they cannot remain 
right. 
As global best practice is showing over and over again, the solution to this 
problem is to allocate shares to each irrigator, and then put in process an 
arrangement that forces the periodic assessment of the annual allocations 
available to each share holder.  No other system is dependable. 
The most dramatic example of this conclusion that we are aware of is in New 
Zealand.  Three years after they rolled out fishing quotas on a ton-by-species 
basis, the Government of New Zealand compulsorily acquired them all and 
replaced them with fishery shares.  The mistake cost them over $30million 
dollars in compensation.  Unfortunately, few governments have such courage.  
Resources around the world are littered with examples of serious over-
exploitation because hard decisions are deferred indefinitely.   35
In summary, global experience would suggest that South East water licences 
would be more valuable if each volumetric holding or taking allocation was 
issued as a share of the Permissible Annual Volume.   Some will argue that 
there is very little difference between the current arrangements and issuance 
of formal shares.   The reason for this is that all licences state that the 
Minister may vary licence conditions is issued annually.  This is true but in 
practice volume or area allocations are rarely changed, as the process is 
administratively complex and time consuming.  The main advantages of 
defining rights as a proportional share are that this approach 
•  Forces annual estimation and announcement of PAV in a transparent 
manner; 
•  Makes it clear how the risk of any variations in the PAV as a result of 
changes in climate or knowledge about aquifer potential is allocated; 
•  Removes the need to recall and re-issue all licences every time the PAV is 
changed. 
Consequently, we recommend that the Board pursue opportunities to 
convert existing licences into tradeable shares.  (R3)  This could be 
achieved at the same time as area allocations are converted to volumetric 
allocations and when holding allocations are transferred or attached to a 
taking licence. 
 
This report must address whether trading arrangements could increase the 
number of management areas that are over-used and, where this occurs, ask 
the question:  Can trading arrangements be used to help solve this problem? 
The answer to the first question yes.  Trading can be expected to result in 
over-use of aquifers in the South East. 
The answer to the second question is yes too. Trading arrangements can be 
used to reduce over-allocation problems.  One of the most recent examples 
of this approach can be found in New South Wales, where over-allocation 
problems in the abalone industry are being solved by retiring 50% of each 
allocation each time it is traded.  Bluntly, the approach taxes those people 
who leave the industry and it discourages adjustment. 
From the Board’s perspective, apart from putting in place strategies to bring 
all current allocations in line with the Permissible Annual Volume (PAV), a 
serious issue is the question of how well these PAVs have been set.  In areas 
where irrigation is more profitable than dryland agriculture, trade can be 
expected to take use to the limit set by the sum of all allocations.  Trade 
flushes out water which is not being used (sleeper licences).  Where 
assumed relationships among area, pumped volume, recycling and crop type 
parameters are incorrect, over-use can be the result.   36
Opportunity Two:  Periodically announce evapo-transpiration 
assumptions about the relationship between volume pumped and 
volume used 
Our consultations with the people in the South East have revealed that water 
licence arrangements are poorly understood. A major source of this 
misunderstanding is a failure to understand how Area (Site) Taking 
Allocations convert to Volumetric Licences.  The source of this confusion lies 
in the failure to understand that PAVs are worked out based on the volume 
used not the volume pumped.  A typical scenario in Zone 3 of the Lacepede-
Kongorong Prescribed Wells Area would be  
•  ￿I have 50 ha in irrigation equivalents￿ 
•  ￿for a standard reference crop this entitles me to use 4.93 ML per ha￿ 
•  ￿so I have a licence to use 4.93 x 50 = 246.5 ML per year￿ 
•  ￿but as I am flood irrigating annual clover with a crop area ratio of 2.8 
means I am allowed to have 50 x 2.8 = 140 ha of clover￿ 
•  ￿But to grow this clover, I know that I pump around 1000 ML per annum!￿ 
All this is correct. The missing piece in the equation is a set of formulae that 
allow for estimation of the proportion of water that returns to the aquifer.   If 
1000 ML is pumped, and it is assumed that clover under flood irrigation 
75.35% of this water returns to the aquifer, then there is no problem.  To 
facilitate trade and, in particular, conversion from one crop to another, 
or from one form of irrigation technology to another, a set of Pump-To-
Use-Coefficients (PTUCs) are necessary.  These coefficients should 
indicate the difference between what is pumped and what is used.  
Under some flood irrigation systems, as much as 4 times the amount 
that either transpired or evaporates is pumped.  (R4) 
Opportunity Three: Convert from irrigation equivalents to volumetric 
licences 
A major issue for the South East is to find the most equitable means to 
convert those parts of the existing licence system that are still area-based to 
volumetric or, if this direction is not acceptable, then how to convert the 
volumetric holdings into area-based allocations.  The central building blocks 
for the system are current definitions of the volume of water that is "used" by 
the reference crop for each zone.  As the rate of evapo-transpiration from a 
reference crop has been used as the basis for estimation of the consistency 
of allocations with the PAV for each management area, we do not 
recommend departure from this framework.  There is considerable confusion 
in the South East about  
•  the difference between the volume pumped and volume used; and 
•  how these volumes relate to the crop area ratios used to define the area 
that may be irrigated.   37
Under some flood irrigation systems, the volume pumped may be as much as 
4 times the volume that transpires, evaporates or is exported from the district 
in the product produced.  Collectively, this is what is "used".  That which 
returns to the unconfined aquifer is available for re-use.   
Global experience indicates that communities will fight for ever over the most 
appropriate way to re-allocate water, and that the most successful systems 
are those that are built on sound conceptual foundations but start by 
mimicking existing conditions as closely as possible.  Given this, we 
recommend that any person wishing to trade an area licence, or expand an 
area licence, have the volumetric "use" defined by multiplying the irrigation 
area estimate by the current estimate of "use" per hectare for the reference 
crop.  Management plans should then stipulate the assumed Pump To Use 
Coefficient (PTUC) for each crop and type of irrigation. 
Take, for example, the case of a person who holds 21 ha of irrigation 
equivalents and is using this to irrigate Sub-clover seed in Zone 3 of the 
Lacepede-Kongorong Prescribed Wells Area.  The assumed rate of 
evaporation and, hence, use from this crop is 4.93 ML per hectare so the 
volumetric allocation would be  
21 hectares times 4.93 ML = 103.53 ML 
This is the amount that would be tradeable.  That which may be pumped, 
however, could be quite different from this.  The crop area ratio for Sub-clover 
seed in Zone 3 is 2.7.  This, however, is not the number that is needed.  What 
is needed is a set of PTUC that facilitate estimation of the volume that may be 
pumped for a reference crop and for the crop that is grown.  The PTUC for 
the reference crop may, for example, be 4.0 and for Sub-clover seed be 5.2 
or 3.8.  In the first instance, we suggest that the PTUC set for each crop 
should be set as close as possible to current practice.  Each management 
plan should then provide for the periodic review of each PTUC.  Where 
significant errors exist, the plan could provide for a gradual transition that 
brings the PTUC in line with reality.  
Thus, we recommend putting in place a means of accounting for water that is 
used and facilitating trade in a low cost manner.  In the first instance, the key 
is to mimic current practice and move systematically to water allocations (and 
use patterns) that are sustainable.  Again our emphasis is on getting the 
fundamentals right. 
A related problem, is a widely held perception that current crop area ratios are 
incorrect.  Processes are in place to review them and a significant number of 
people are expecting their allocation to increase.  In some cases, the 
allocations are expected to be doubled.  If the roll out has been complete, 
however, any increase in allocation immediately creates a situation where the 
aquifer is over-allocated.   
Consider a typical management area, such as that modelled in Figure 3.  The 
PAV is assumed to be1000 ML.  At present, let￿s say 400 ML are being used 
(transpired and evaporated) under Area (Site) Allocation Licences.  During 
the roll out, 100 ML was set aside for the environment and 100 ML for 
increases in forest area over the next two years.  The remaining 400 ML were   38
issued to water users as Volumetric Holding Allocations.  These holding 
allocations are then traded and converted into taking licence to facilitate an 
increase in the area planted to vines. Two scenarios are possible.   
Figure 3:  The current relationship among licensed allocations and PAV 
in a mock-up management area 
Permissible Annual Volumes



















Under scenario one, the conversion of the 400 ML holding to a Volumetric 
(Site) Taking Allocation occurs and then aquifer return coefficients are written 
into the licence in a manner that allows their periodic revision and no PAV 
problem should emerge. 
Under scenario two, the conversion is to an Area (Site) Taking Allocation 
using the assumed crop area ratio for vines of 3.5.  If subsequent research 
shows the correct crop area ratio to be 2.5 then the aquifer becomes 16% 
over-allocated.10   
We recommend that policies be put in place to ensure that trading 
arrangements retain consistency with the PAV set for each area evolve 
and change through time.  The definitions of allocations should 
recognise that PAVs.  (R5)  As indicated in Table 3, ten water management 
areas are already over-allocated.  Moreover, we stress that global experience 
would suggest that the science of estimating PAVs is far from perfect.  Today, 
a significant number of groundwater dependent regions are in serious 
                                            
10   [{((3.5/2.5)*800)-800}/1000])*100=32%.  The error occurs over the full 800ML, not just 
the 400ML, that is converted to a taking allocation.  The allocation for the forest and 
environment are not tradeable in our mock-up.   39
economic, social and environmental difficulty because initial estimates of PAV 
proved, in retrospect, to be an over-estimate. 
Table 3  Extent of allocation in selected parts of the South East ranked 
by extent of over-allocation  
(as of June 1999 and before the pro-rata roll-out)* 
 





Zone 4A  105.1 
MacDonnell 104.2 





Zone 3A  99.5 
Zone 5A  98.5 
Cannawigra 98.3 
Pendleton 89.8 
Zone 2A  80.3 
Zone 7A  95% 
*  For more information, see Figure 4.   
For dependability of supply and for no backsliding in quality, changes of the 
magnitude being contemplated need to be negotiated carefully with all 
people.  One model that we suggest, as a draft proposal, is as follows: 
1)  Communicate the difference between volume pumped and volume 
used carefully. 
2)  Communicate the need to keep total volume used less than PAV. 
3)  Discuss options with licence holders with a view to deciding whether or 
not the stated relationship between each irrigation equivalent and PAV 
is to hold.  If it is, then: 
-  add a volumetric and/or PAV share statement to each licence 
and introduce meters; 
-  set the PTUC for each crop type so that no adjustment is 
needed in the first 5 years;   40
-  put a 10-year PTUC adjustment plan in place so that gradual 
changes occur in these coefficients. 
-  Only allow trading of volumetric allocations 
A related issue is consideration of the benefits, or the merits, of encouraging 
efficient water use.  Under a metered proportional share system, irrigators 
who switch to more efficient irrigation techniques and use less water, would 
be free to sell surplus water to others or expand the area they irrigate.  If an 
irrigation equivalent allocation system is used, there is no incentive to trade or 
to improve water-use efficiency, as the "saved" water would move to an 
unallocated pool. 
In summary, a share of the PAV is the most secure way of defining a right 
that is known and is certainly the most environmentally-dependable right that 
can be allocated to users.11  Each year, each user might be sent a letter that 
announces the PAV and the user￿s allocation as a result.  The clear 
advantage is that even if PAV reviews only occur every five years, an 
expectation of having a share in a resource is established.  For example, an 
allocation of 5% of the PAV would be 50 ML, if the PAV were estimated to be 
1000 ML, and 40 ML if the PAV had to be reduced to 800 ML for some 
reason. 
If the Board, in consultation with the State Government, opts to define 
allocations as proportional shares of the PAV associated with each 
aquifer, we recommend finding a simple straightforward means of 
calculating each person￿s share.  As a basis for discussion, it is 
suggested that each person’s share could be defined as the quantity of 
water assumed to either transpire or evaporate from the reference crop.  
If this option is taken then the sum of allocations should retain 
consistency with the PAV.  Most other models will require a subsequent 
pro-rata adjustment to once again make the sum of all allocations 
consistent with the PAV.  (R6) 
There are serious consequences for the Board if it gets bogged down in 
consultation and discussions of equity and fairness.  Experience in other parts 
of Australia and with other natural resources suggests that communities can 
get embroiled in arguments about how to fix the problem.  Meanwhile the 
resource comes under increasing pressure.  In over-allocated areas in New 
South Wales, no trading is being allowed until these issues are resolved.  
According to Figure 4, there are at least ten hundreds which are over 
allocated. 
                                            
11   It is possible do define shares in complicated ways that reserve windfall gains to the 
Crown etc.  The administrative and political costs of such arrangements tend to be prohibitive.   41
Figure 4 Location of hundreds and management areas in the South East  
South East Water Allocation - June 1999
N
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Opportunity Four:  Separate Access Licence from Volumetric Holding 
Over the last few years, the South East has been separating licences to use 
water from land titles.  Under the new arrangements, any person may hold a 
Water Holding Allocation and these licences contain no reference to a 
certificate of title. At present, virtually all people who hold Water Holding 
Licences in the South East, also, hold an interest in land within the 
management area described by the licence.  With time, however, we can 
expect people to accumulate water holdings and/or sell the land they own, but 
not their water holding.  Gradually, land will become more and more 
separated from water holding.  Trading arrangements can be used to bring 
this water into use.  Sometimes these trades will be permanent.  At the other 
extreme, people will buy the water they need on an annual basis especially if 
the annual market evolves. 
Under current administrative arrangements in the South East, the volumetric 
component of a taking licence is still tied to a certificate of title.  World best 
practice, draft guidelines about to be released by the High Level Steering 
Group on Water, and the current Water Resources Bill before the NSW 
legislature, all recommend clear separation of the holding from the access 
licence.  Separating the right to access, and the right to a specific volume, 
allows for simpler trading, removes a number of impediments to economic 
opportunity, and allows administrators to focus on resource management 
issues. 
Different terms are used across Australia, but as recommended earlier, the 
right to receive periodic allocations of water that may be used for irrigation or 
other similar purposes, are best described as a ￿share￿.  Failing this, they 
should be described as an entitlement to use a volume of water in a manner 
that makes it clear that this volume will be periodically varied in an equitable, 
non-capricious manner.  Across the South East, and the rest of South 
Australia, the first step in achieving this separation would be to separate out 
the volumetric component of each licence.   
Figure 5 summarises the nature of the transition that is occurring elsewhere 
and is now considered as world best practice by most specialists in the design 
of tradeable right systems.   43
Figure 5  Separating water and land titles into their various components 
Refining Property Rights
Title to Land
- - - - - - - - - - - -
Title to Water
Right to use a volume or
share of PAV
Site specific access or use licence
stating conditions necessary to
manage aquifer quality, to
unacceptable draw down, maintain
wetlands etc  
We recommend that policies and management plans encourage people 
to allow separation of volumetric entitlements from access for ￿use￿ 
entitlements, so that these rights can be sold or leased to separate 
people.  (R7) 
It is our tentative assessment that separation of the volumetric licence from 
the use or access right could be achieved administratively.12  Separation 
could be achieved by issuing Water Taking Licences that sets an upper limit 
on the quantity of water that may be used or pumped per year and making 
that use conditional upon access to a holding equivalent to that volume. 
An example (set out in Figure 6) will make this clear.  Let￿s assume: 
•  Individual A has a bore with an Area (Site) Taking Allocation, to take the 
equivalent of 40 ML of water, by irrigating 10 hectares of pasture. 
•  When A’s licence was issued, the decision to allow this was based on a 4 
kilometre square test and it was granted on the understanding that this 
would prevent development of irrigation in the shadow around A (grey 
area in Figure 6). This was done because it was recognised that irrigation 
at both A and C would cause unacceptable salinity problems. 
•  In 2002, B signs a contract with A to lease the water 
                                            
12   To do this, a licence would simply state the maximum amount that can be used or 
may be pumped in any irrigation year.  We can, however, find no direct power enabling the 
Minister to partition a taking allocation into a taking allocation plus a holding allocation.  It 
could be possible for the Minister to require surrender of an existing allocation and then to re-
issue a taking allocation and a holding allocation to the same person.   44
Under existing arrangements, a shadow is left over the land held by C. He or 
she cannot develop their land for irrigation because there is a risk that the 
lease to B could be cancelled.   
•  Soon after the lease is finalised, A sells their now dryland farm and retires 
to Mount Gambier, Naracoorte or Keith with the licence and the income 
stream realisable from lease payments. 
The land once held by A and C￿s property have water use shadows over their 
land, even though no irrigation is occurring.  We could go on and develop 
further scenarios.  What is needed, is an administrative solution to the 
problem. 
Figure 6:  An illustration of the way water trading will create 
development shadows over significant and valuable areas of 
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What are the options to deal with the shadow issue? 
Option A   
If the South East moves to a dual right system, that requires each irrigator to 
hold a both a "taking" licence and either lease or own a "holding" licence, then 
the issues are simplified. 
1)  The holding issue is left to market forces. 
2)  The access, use or taking conditions are set out in a separate licence. 
Under this scenario, the 4 kilometre square test would still apply but the 
maximum amount that could be "used" per land title area in any one year 
would be set out in the access conditions.  Hydrogeological assessment 
would be limited to consideration of issues that relate to acceptable ways 
of using water. 
3)  If C wants to irrigate then either they must convince the Department to 
cancel the taking allocation that attaches to A or negotiate a transfer of 
this access right from property A to property C.13 Across the world, two 
approaches to this problem are taken. Either 
•  Negotiation is left to A and C 
•  ￿A￿ must show cause as to why the use right should not be 
cancelled.  ￿A￿ must show cause he or she doesn￿t irrigate after a 
period of time say 3 to 5 years 
We leave the choice between these two alternatives immediately above to the 
Board and Government.  We do, however, draw attention to the fact that in 
some areas, especially ones where salinity is a major problem, the limiting 
property right may be the access right to an area where soils are valuable.  In 
these situations, the access right may be very valuable while the 
corresponding holding right may be of much less value. 
If, as we recommend, the Board supports separation of access rights from 
volumetric rights to the Government, and the recommendation is adopted, 
then very careful consideration needs to be given to the administrative 
implications of this recommendation.  In areas where salinity rather than 
volume limits water use, then the result could be a flood of applications for 
access licences.  To prevent this occurring, we recommend that To prevent 
people from capriciously acting to create a shadow over another 
person’s holding, all new access licences contain a condition that will 
result in the forfeiture that shadowing opportunity if it has not been 
used for four years.  This should not extend to the volumetric allocation 
attached to a licence, only the right to use that volume at a specific 
location.  (R8) 
                                            
13   For A to agree to this, it would be necessary either for the Minister to agree to convert 
the volumetric portion of this allocation into a holding allocation and then allow it to be 
temporarily transferred to C.   46
Option B   
If the South East does not move to a framework that separates access and 
holding issues, then either: 
1)  Approval of long-term leases of water could be made conditional upon an 
agreement to surrender the right to return this water to its "home" location 
for the leased period. 
2)  Alternatively, approval of a long-term lease of water would be made 
conditional upon the prior conversion of the taking licence into a holding 
allocation and then the attachment of that holding licence to the new area. 
3)  A sunset clause could be introduced requiring surrender of the right to 
return the water to A after a period of, say, 3 years of non-use at 
location A. 
We consider this option to be inferior to Option A, but acknowledge that it is 
possible. 
Opportunity Five:  Introduce water meters as a precondition to trade 
As summarised in Figure 7 it is now State policy to move all groundwater 
irrigation to meters within 5 years.  Across the World, and even in South 
Australia, all water managers are moving away from area-based allocation 
systems and moving toward fully-metered systems.  The most recent 
example of this is in the Barossa Valley.  Across the entire Barossa Valley, 
the Barossa Catchment Management Board has installed (or is in the process 
of installing) meters on all bores.  A single contract was issued via a tender 
process. The cost of these meters increases with pipe diameter.  The cost of 
an installed meter on 32mm pipe was in the vicinity of $330 per meter.  Costs 
increased to approximately $1200 with installation for a 150mm pipe 
diameter.14  The specifications for the meters were written to ensure that all 
the meters are of high quality, are tamper proof and require low maintenance. 
The cost of installing meters on 600mm pipes with some of the flood irrigators 
is going to be considerably higher. 
                                            
14   Costs are indicative.  This information is commercial-in-confidence.   47
Figure 7  State policy on introduction of meters 
Extract from State Water Plan, page 58, Volume 1 
 
"Volumetric Allocations and Measuring  
An important prerequisite for efficient water use and good water resources management practice is to 
be able to accurately measure how much water is being used. It is often said that if you can￿t measure 
it, you can￿t manage it, and this applies to water use as much as it does to any other activity. Not all 
water allocations in South Australia are volumetric at present and not all water use is measured. This 
will be addressed over the next five years, by which time all allocations will have been converted to a 
volumetric basis and all water use will be measured.  
 
Action 
The Government will, by 2005, have converted all water allocations to a volumetric basis and all water 
use will be measured so that the Department for Water Resources can determine the annual amount of 
water taken." 
Global experience has revealed repeatedly that meters increase trust in the 
system, allow effective monitoring of use, create incentives for people to 
increase the efficiency of water use, reduce transaction costs, allow much 
easier and more equitable adjustment to changes in Permissible Annual 
Volumes, etc.  
Considerable resistance to metering was expressed as part of the 
consultation phase of the Water Allocation Plan and during our focus group 
meetings with irrigators.  The problem and the resolution of the problem may 
lie in how the issues are communicated.  In discussing the need to meter 
water, it became apparent that flood irrigators are concerned about the 
difference between water used and water pumped.  Most irrigators, which we 
consulted with, had never heard a discussion of the difference between 
pumping entitlements and estimates of the water used.  Others stated that 
they believed these issues had been discussed publicly in community 
consultation meetings. 
As an option, the Board may like to give priority to the introduction of meters 
in its most stressed management areas, and set a rule that requires 
compulsory introduction of meters on all bores in an area when use exceeds, 
say, 80% of PAV or in areas where salinity problems are severe and water 
use of very high value.  There are a number of ways meters can be 
introduced: 
1)  Install meters on every bore within a specified time period via a centralised 
tender process that would reduce the costs considerably, compared with 
one-off purchases by each licensee as they begin to trade. 
2)  Require meters to be installed on every bore that is involved in a trade, 
and all new bores. 
Given that it is State policy that all bores should be metered before 
2005, we recommend that no trades be allowed to or from bores that are 
not metered.  That is, any person who wishes to expand the area they 
irrigate, or any person wishing to acquire water from another person, be 
allowed to use that water only if they first convert their allocation to a 
volumetric one.  (R9)   48
Once metering is in place, many of the other steps to streamline the process 
will fall into place.  For example, introducing water accounts and 
arrangements that enable people to carry forward water from year to year will 
be simple and straight forward.  We will deal first with carry forward 
provisions, then accounting arrangements and provide a tidy example. 
Carry forward arrangements 
The current water licensing arrangements in the South East are based on the 
allocation of areas that may be irrigated.  This means that each irrigator is 
able to apply water as needed.  Typically, and as would be expected, more 
water is applied in a dry year and less in a wet year.  Moreover, crop area 
ratios are based on average rates of use, not maximum rates of use.  
Introduction of metering and transition to volumetric allocations, however, 
means that a framework that mimics existing practices needs to be found.  In 
practice, water use and trading arrangements need to be flexible.  
Importantly, this has major implications for the nature of the temporary 
market. 
a.  If no carry forward is allowed, then the market value of water in dry years 
will be very high and opposition to the introduction of meters extreme. 
b.  If 100% carry forward is allowed, then people may stockpile water and 
then demand rights to use it in non-sustainable ways. 
c.  If, say, 30% of unused water may be carried forward, then there is an 
incentive for people to over-irrigate rather than conserve water. 
d.  If carry forward is allowed, up to a limit of say, one or two times an 
individual￿s annual allocation, then there is an efficient incentive for water 
users to self-manage for drought and climatic fluctuations.  Under this 
arrangement, people can be expected to trade water until everyone that 
wants to is carrying forward one year’s allocation. 
In practice, carry forward arrangements may need to vary from management 
area to management area.  Thus, it seems most appropriate to specify the 
rules that apply in the plans being developed for each management area.  As 
an interim strategy, and without access to data on water use practices at the 
individual farm level, we recommend that upon conversion to a 
volumetric, each holder of a (taking) licence be allocated one year’s 
allocation and that the maximum amount that may be carried forward 
from year to year be one year’s allocation.  (R10)  Similarly, we 
recommend that the penalty for over-pumping, that is pumping without 
an allocation, be double the amount that is pumped in excess of the 
allocation held.  Consistent with this model, people with a volumetric 
holding licence should be allowed to carry forward up to one year’s 
allocation.  (R11) 
Given that the Board has yet to decide how to convert area allocations into 
volumetric allocations, it is important to ensure that people are not given the 
opportunity to increase their share of the PAV by using the trading process to   49
convert a volumetric allocation into an area allocation and then back into 
larger volumetric allocation. 
Accounting for water use 
Once meters are installed, the cost of permanent trades can be simplified 
considerably, by separating the water holding right from the annual allocation. 
World best practice, here, copies the systems used to track money in different 
people’s accounts.  As in most financial systems, a share holding entitles the 
person who holds that share on allocation day to receive an allocation or 
dividend.  That allocation or dividend is then banked.  All users must have an 
account and if the account is in deficit they are penalised. 
Allocations are credited to an account. Periodic allocations can be transferred 
electronically or by cheque (See Figure 8).  The account would have an 
opening balance that would reflect carry over from the previous year plus the 
allocation for that year totaling, for example, 50 ML.  If the licence holder 
needed an additional 25 ML of water and could lease the water, the balance 
would increase by 25 to 75 ML.  If this was a vineyard, and the water use was 
considered to be 100% of the 65 ML that was pumped, the account balance 
would be reduced to10 ML.  Depending on conditions in the aquifer, most of 
the water could be assumed to carry-over to the following year, say 9 out 10 
ML for example.  Water used, water that evaporates or moves down the 
aquifer before it can be used, is debited from the account. Rules about carry 
forward from season to season, etc need to be explicit. Visually, the account 
would look like that set out in Figure 9 below.  Each water licence holder 
could view his/her account via the internet.  The account could be confidential 
to the user or open to the management area via passwords. 
Figure 8:  A water cheque 
Pay ____________________________________________
The sum of  ___________________________ ML of Water from the____________   Management Area
SE Water Trading
Signature______________________
807512  085 249:0223  7851
Date ____________
____________ML
   50
Figure 9:  A mock-up of a water account 
 
Water Account                                                              Statement No. 8
Account Name: Mary Smith and Associates                                                            Page 
1 of 1 
 
Shares held:  1,200          Maximum carry forward from one season to the next 1,200 ML 
Date   Debit  Credit  Balance 
1/07/00  Balance Brought Forward    400
1/09/00  Annual allocation, 1200 
shares @1 ML per share 
1,200 1,600
1/11/00  Purchase from Water 
Trading Pty Ltd 
600 2,200
1/1/01  Water pumped 1/7/00 to 
31/12/00 (3600 ML 
deemed use = 25%) 
900  1,300
30/6/01  Water pumped 1/1/01 to 
30/6/01 3600 ML deemed 
use = 25% 
0  1,300
30/6/01  Unused water that may not 
be carried forward 
100  1,200
We recommend that a simple bank-like water accounting system be 
established for the South East’s Water Resources so that low-cost 
volumetric trading arrangements can occur quickly and simply.  (R12) 
Opportunity Six: Introduce Recharge Credits and Debits 
Throughout the South East, the entire allocation system is based on 
estimates of rates of recharge to the unconfined aquifer.  Three things can 
have a dramatic effect on these estimates: 
•  Land-use changes that significantly affect rates of recharge 
•  Water transfers between aquifers, especially in areas where the 
confined aquifer supports uncapped artesian bores 
•  Water harvesting for aquifer recharge.   51
The latter two of these effects can be tracked easily using meters and, if 
appropriate, incorporated into a water accounting system that facilitates the 
equivalent of a temporary trade.  The most important requirement is that 
consistency between the water allocation system and estimates of PAV be 
maintained through time in an equitable and efficient manner.   
During the roll-out, and in all areas where the unconfined aquifer was not 
already fully allocated, a two year margin for forestry and other significant 
recharge depleting changes, was set aside before the pro-rata roll out.  
Beyond that point and in those areas already fully or over-allocated, if the 
integrity of the PAV-total allocation relationship is to be maintained, then any 
approval to significantly change land use in a recharge sense, needs to be 
made conditional upon an off-setting transaction.  If a person wishes to 
convert a dryland pasture to a bluegum plantation, for example, this change 
will need to be done in a manner that reflects the fact that less water will now 
be available for irrigation.  Equitably, we suggest that people who, for 
example, convert a plantation back to dryland pasture, should receive a credit 
that can be converted back into a water holding allocation. 
Conceptually, there are three ways that changes in land-use, that significantly 
effect rates of groundwater recharge, could be incorporated into the existing 
allocation system.  Each has the same effect but quite different administrative 
costs and implications.  Summarised in Figure 10, the options are: 
•  Option A ￿ require approval to effect recharge, but approval would be 
conditional upon reallocation of water licences. All existing forests etc, are 
issued a licence.  Effectively, each tree is defined as a mini-spray irrigator; 
•  Option B - require any landholder who wishes to change land use in a 
manner that significantly changes recharge, to obtain a licence to do so, 
and to hold an allocation equivalent to the effect of that change on 
recharge.  (A 2002 baseline is set and all land-use changes from that base 
are brought into the system); 
•  Option C - require any landholder who wishes to change land use in a 
manner that significantly reduces recharge, to surrender allocation 
equivalent to the effect of that change on recharge and allocate a new 
holding allocation to any person who increases recharge.   52
Figure 10 Options for modifying the allocation system to account for the 
effects of land-use change on recharge so that PAV remains 




















































Of the three options, Option C is the simplest in administrative terms.  It also 
reduces the cost of monitoring because PAV remains consistent with the rate 
of vertical recharge. 
Option A takes the Board into the realm of integrated catchment modelling.  
Option A requires a large amount of hydrogeological survey information, and 
administrative effort.  The value of the economic opportunity allocated, 
however, is the same as Option C.  Option B is similar to Option C but builds 
a system that will require continual reference back to an arbitrary reference 
date.  With time Option B will drift further and further away from reality.  
Option C has low set-up and maintenance costs; and keeps PAV consistent 
with reality.   
Under Option C, if a person wishes to plant 100 hectares of forest and this 
was estimated to reduce water use by 90 ML they would first have to buy and 
surrender 90 ML.  If another person held a licence for 1000 ML in a water 
management area with a PAV of 10,000 ML, then as a result of this 
transaction, their share of the PAV would rise from 1000/10,000 to 
1000/(10,000-90).   53
In summary, for simplicity, and in order to keep administrative and monitoring 
costs low, we suggest that negative recharge change effects be retired from 
the allocation system, and the option to roll recharge credits into the allocation 
be established.  By doing this, any periodic estimate of PAV, will remain 
consistent with the rate of recharge that is actually occurring, not tied back to 
an arbitrary point in time.  We recommend that land-use change approvals 
that are likely to significantly reduce recharge should be made 
conditional upon surrender of an allocation equivalent to the expected 
effect on this change on the aquifer and modification of the PAV for the 
relevant management area. Conversely, when a person plans to 
significantly increase recharge and they register their intent to do so, 
they should be able to apply for a new water holding in proportion to the 
increase in PAV that their action creates.  (R13)  Significant recharge 
effect allocations are not necessary.   54
PART FOUR:  MARKETING ARRANGEMENTS 
An unusual feature of the current water market in the South East, is that in 
reality it consists of 70 little markets - one for each hundred or management 
area.  At present, buyers and sellers must seek out one another through 
informal networks.  A water market need not be a physical place, but a 
network would greatly facilitate orderly buying and selling of water.  In this 
part of our report, we focus on options to make these markets work for the 
collective interest of people in the South East, and to make protection of the 
region’s water resources easier. We search in particular, for arrangements 
that create a sense of respect, understanding and trust. 
Nominating a Broker or Brokers 
Most markets for natural resources, like water, involve brokers and/or dealers.  
In return for a commission, these people search for willing buyers and sellers 
and bring them together in a manner that enables them to charge a 
commission.  As a result of water reforms in other parts of Australia, a 
number of water broking businesses have been set up across Australia.  
Some offer full internet trading, others provide information over the internet 
but settle trades off-line.  Many land agents also get involved in water trading 
on an opportunistic basis.  Many people negotiate trades privately with each 
other. 
As summarised in Table 2, the largest number of trades that have ever 
occurred in the South East in any one year is just under 300.  When divided 
among the many management areas involved in trading, this means that 
there are not enough trades, for highly competitive and well-informed markets 
to emerge without careful administrative guidance. Various models are 
possible: 
1.  The Board and/or the Department could maintain a register of completed 
trades so that those interested in finding out price histories and transaction 
details can do so in the same way as they can for any land dealing in the 
State. 
2.  The Board could maintain a register or Bulletin Board of people interested 
in trading water. 
3.  The Board could maintain its own secure internet trading site and provide 
associated facilities, although arguably, this would represent a conflict of 
interest. 
4.  The Board could run a competitive tender process to select a preferred 
broker to maintain internet trading facilities for all management areas in 
the South East, and on behalf of the Board develop water trading in the 
South East.  A minimum set of services would be specified, and fixed 
annual fee paid to the broker for assistance in developing the market, 
making information available, etc.  During the selection process, 
competition would focus on the range of additional services offered and 
fee to be charged for each transaction.   55
5.  The market could be allowed to develop as opportunities for profit 
emerged. 
Of the options listed, we perceive the best mix to be one where any person 
who wishes to find out the details of recent trades, the current market price of 
water etc. can do so.  Coupled with this, we recommend that a process be 
run to select a preferred broker to provide an internet site and 
associated trading service for the South East for a period of 
5 years.  (R14)  We recommend this option, as we perceive it to be more cost 
effective to encourage a third party to develop the trading skills, necessary 
software and processes.  It is also wise for the Board to avoid any 
accusations of conflict of interest. During the short listing process when a 
preferred broker is selected, we recommend that the Board explore the 
merits of contracting the preferred broker to communicate trading 
opportunities to irrigators and those with water holding licences. In 
partnership with the preferred broker, the Board prepare an information 
booklet on trading opportunities, processes and arrangements.  (R15)15   
After the first five years, it may not be necessary to continue with a preferred 
broker arrangement, as the market should be well established. 
As the market develops, the Board, in conjunction with other Boards in 
South Australia, could encourage brokers to develop a process of 
accreditation in a manner similar to the real estate industry.  Ideally, all 
brokers would need to demonstrate knowledge, carry liability insurance 
and adhere to a professional code of practice.  (R16) 
In passing, we note that international experience and research suggest that 
one of the most effective trading arrangements is what is sometimes 
known as a double auction process.  Under this arrangement, offers to sell 
and offers to buy are listed on a bulletin board or equivalent (i.e. internet) for 
a fixed period.  Bids and offers remain open until an appointed time and all 
people can see the nature of all bids and all offers.  People on both sides are 
allowed to revise their bids and make additional bids and offers until the 
market closes. Another model is a sealed bid auction or tender process, 
which is similar, but under this model no-one knows the extent of all other 
bids.  At closure, the market clearing price is what is paid or received. 
                                            
15   Consultation with irrigators may suggest wisdom in commissioning two brokers.  One 
for the Upper South East and one for the Lower South East. Once both are established they 
may choose to compete with each other.   56
PART FIVE:  MAKING THE MARKET WORK EFFICIENTLY, EQUITABLY 
AND DEPENDABLY 
As already noted, the water market in most part of the South East is likely to 
remain "thin".  That is, the number of transactions that occur in any 
management area, is likely to be relatively small.  In such situations, 
administrators search for arrangements that deepen and expand the market. 
One of the most effective ways of doing this is to focus on the incentive for 
people to trade and to lease or sell unused water allocations.  As a general 
rule, there will be more trades if: 
•  the broking fee is low (achieved by commissioning a preferred broker)  
•  information about prices is freely available (achieved by establishing and 
publicising market trends, allowing people to search a central register of 
transactions, etc) 
•  anonymous lists of water available for sale is easily available (achieved by 
selecting a preferred broker and requiring provision of an internet site, etc) 
•  application fees are low and approvals rapid (achieved by adopting 
processes that simplify administration) 
•  it is possible to get prior approval to use water at a location ( achieved by 
separating holding licences from access issues, so that people can get 
approval to irrigate before they search for the water to use) 
•  the trading areas are large (achieved by allowing trial trading across 
management area borders and following separation of holding and taking 
licences, searching for opportunities to combine management areas) 
•  low cost temporary trades are possible with immediate approval (achieved 
by separating  holding and taking licences, introducing meters and setting 
up a water accounting system) 
•  borrowing from future allocations is discouraged (achieved by setting a 
100% penalty for borrowing water from next year’s allocation - in effect the 
rule is, if you take 10 ML from next year’s allocation rather than buying it 
you lose 20 ML off the top of next year’s allocation) 
In addition, the Board and the Government need to consider how best to 
allocate water in those parts of the South East where the roll out has not been 
complete.  Data on the extent of unallocated water in the South East is not 
yet available but is expected to be considerable in the Lacepede Kongorong 
Prescribed Area.  The reason why this water has not been applied for is 
primarily because people perceive it to be of little value.  Consequently, we 
recommend that no unallocated water be released until a strong, viable 
market is established.  On a management area by management area 
basis and as an interim strategy, unallocated water could be used to 
deepen the market for water by offering it for sale on an annual 
basis.  (R17).   57
Deepening the Market 
One of the most innovative mechanisms used to improve thin markets has 
been developed in the United States.  In this country, coal powered electricity 
generation facilities participate in a sulphur dioxide emissions trading 
system.16  As so few power stations are involved, every year a proportion of 
each licence holder’s allocation is put up for sale.  The power station is free to 
set as high a reserve price as they wish, but is forced to think about and make 
their allocation available.  Bids and reserve prices are anonymous so that 
firms can not determine strategically who they sell to. The result is a 
mechanism that frees up any unused allocations and encourages firms to 
innovate.  Adjustment is occurring at the most cost-effective locations.  Each 
year the total allocation to each firm is reduced on a pro-rata basis. It also 
makes the unit value of each allocation abundantly clear to all.  The system is 
known as a "zero-revenue auction" because the government offers this 
service at no charge and, hence, collects zero-revenue from the process. 
Applied to water markets in the South East, such an arrangement has the 
potential to speed adjustment and increase investment.   The system would 
only work in areas where meters are in place.  Our recommendation is the 
Water Resources Act be amended to allow any hundred or management 
area, to introduce an annual zero-revenue process, if more than two 
thirds of irrigators support the idea.  Under this mechanism, 10% of 
each holding would be offered for sale via a mechanism where the 
expected clearing prices would be publicised for a week, and reserve 
prices changed in light of this information.  Water holders should be 
encouraged to add additional water to zero-revenue auction (R18). In 
making this recommendation, we can report that, in several of the focus group 
meetings, the irrigators were quite enthusiastic about these auctions, but felt 
that it would be wiser for the mechanism to be introduced voluntarily and 
trialled in one or more management areas.  We note that such an 
arrangement would be of particular interest to any firm commissioned to 
supply a broking service to the South East. 
In addition to this, the Government could agree to only release any 
unallocated water to the South East via this process.  
In the most sophisticated version of this option, a 10% zero-revenue auction 
process would be used for both permanent and temporary trades. 
Boundaries 
Separation of holding and access licences may make it possible to 
amalgamate a number of hundreds into larger management areas.  If this is 
not possible, then we recommend that a review be conducted to select 
some areas where cross-border trading is allowed on a trial basis.  
                                            
16   When burned, sulphur-rich coal releases sulphur dioxide which, when mixed with 
water in the air, forms sulphuric acid.  Acid rain is the result.   58
Cross-border trading may be more feasible if access or use rights are 
separated from volumetric allocations.  (R19) 
Levies and fees 
A related issue is the nature of catchment levies that apply to holding and 
taking allocations.  As the roll-out has not been completed, and marketing 
arrangements have not been put in place yet, the Minister announced that no 
catchment levy will be collected from the owners of holding allocations in 
2000.  In the long run, however, continuance of this exemption will diminish 
the incentive for people to use water.  As noted by the Select Committee, a 
levy on holdings will tend to "flush out" unused water.  The contrary view put 
to us, is that groundwater moves through the South East slowly, therefore 
saving good water for the future and for the environment, is "not a bad 
strategy." 
If PAVs are set and backed by a process encouraging their periodic review, if 
allocations to the environment are appropriate, and if Significant Recharge 
Effect Allocation arrangements are in place, then prospects for sustainable 
economic growth will be greater if a catchment levy is applied to all water 
holdings.17  If the levy should reflect approximate management costs, then it 
is easy to argue for a larger levy on "use".  Consideration could also be given 
to the application of a much higher levy to irrigation enterprises in fully 
allocated management areas that are not metered.  This would reflect the 
expected future costs that non-metered systems impose on management and 
the increased risk that non-metered systems impose on other irrigators and 
on the community. 
During our consultations, a number of people suggested that a higher levy 
should be applied to those people who do not offer water for trade.  We 
observe that if a water accounting system is in place, the economic incentive 
to trade should be sufficient.  If water is not trading, this is probably due to 
either a lack of demand or an impediment in the trading system.  Introduction 
of low cost ways to trade water rather than introduction of tradeable levies is 
the way to go. 
                                            
17   This should not be interpreted as a recommendation for a levy based solely on 
volume.  We have not examined the issue closely, but suspect that the most efficient and 
equitable arrangement is one that involves a levy whose magnitude is, at least, a function of 
volume, area of land held and type of use.   59
A related issue is that of the fees and charges that apply to different types of 
trades.  Under current arrangements 
•  The fee for a new licence is $135.50 
•  The fee for a licence transfer is $250 
•  There is no charge for a hydrogeological assessment.  Complicated 
transfers could be assessed for an additional $100. 
The Board may wish to recommend to the Minister, and the Department 
of Water Resources, that trading fee and levy arrangements be reviewed 
once decisions about other recommendations in this report have been 
made. We recommend that trading fees and levies be aligned with 
administrative costs and kept as low as possible.  The transfer of a 
volume or holding should cost much less than the transfer of an access 
right as only the latter requires a hydrological assessment.  (R20)  They 
need to be consistent with the principles for water reform as laid out by the 
Council of Australian Governments (COAG).  COAG has recommended that 
water pricing should reflect full costs including the cost to the environment.  
Where cross subsidisation occurs, these cross-subsidies should be 
transparent.   Full cost pricing should recognise externalities imposed on 
others. 
Increasing confidence in the licensing system 
One of the problems that plague the introduction of any tradeable property 
right system, is the need to move a complex paper trail of records into a 
formal property register.  South Australia, the home of the Torrens Title 
registration system, is a world leader in the development of such systems.  
Under the Torrens Title system, titles are registered centrally and any dealing 
associated with these titles is valid only when the dealing is recorded on that 
central register.  The Department is moving towards such as system but it is 
not yet in fully in place. 
A public register of water licences and allocations is maintained by the 
Department of Water Resources and can be viewed by the public during 
office hours.  The system is continuously updated and backed up by the 
Department. 
Most banks now require, as part of contractual arrangements, that the 
licensee register the bank￿s interest in the allocation, and that a trade would 
have to be notified, or in some cases approved, by the bank.  A key 
difference between the licence transfer and land title transfer processes, is a 
well-developed suite of settlement protocols, arrangements and standard 
contracts.  These procedures need to be quite different for permanent as 
distinct from temporary or fixed volume transfers.  As a step towards the 
resolution of such issues before a major problem emerges, this issue should 
be discussed with representatives from all catchment Boards.  We 
recommend that dealing and settlement arrangements for all dealings 
associated with permanent water trading, be made consistent with land 
title trades as quickly as possible.  (R21)   60
PART SIX: SUGGESTED IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES 
As indicated in the start of this report, the South East is at a cross-roads in 
water resource management.  With the allocation process completed, further 
development of the region’s water resources and resolution of over-allocation, 
will be most cost effectively achieved through the development of a reliable 
and efficient market for water.   
Permanent and temporary water trading has the potential to deliver economic, 
environmental and social improvement - to deliver a "triple bottom line" 
improvement.  Poorly implemented it also has the potential to deliver an 
administrative, environmental, economic, social and political nightmare.  
Which outcome occurs is a function of the way trading is implemented. 
Essentially, our terms of reference are to: 
•  Identify the issues currently restraining water trading; 
•  Develop/identify a range of processes for the establishment of an effective 
water market; 
•  Identify the critical success factors for water trading; 
•  Identify the experiences from elsewhere, which have proved to be 
unsuccessful or inappropriate for prudent resource management. 
The thrust of our advice is based upon an assumption that the Board wishes 
to deliver its charter that focuses on sustainability.  Global and National 
experience is that, unless the foundations upon which any trading system is 
built are robust, the simple introduction of trading is likely to result first in 
backsliding on environmental objectives, then economic ones and finally 
social ones. 
The South East is one of the more lucky parts of rural Australia.  At the 
moment, its water resources do not appear to be seriously over-allocated and 
it is experiencing a period when, and where, people are interested in 
increasing investment in water and land related activities.  It has significant 
salinity and water contamination problems but, if the recommendations in this 
report are implemented, and on the basis of information provided to us, all 
appear manageable. 
This report finds that one of the main issues restraining water markets, is the 
way that water allocations are defined, allocated and registered.  To develop 
a set of effective, albeit thin markets, it is necessary to put in place a set of 
arrangements that will ensure that each management area does not trade 
into problems and also to facilitate separation of access and volumetric 
considerations. To do this, we have recommended development of a share or 
similar strategy to ensure that allocations remain less than PAV at all times.  
We also recommend that people be informed of opportunities to separate 
access rights from volumetric entitlements. 
What trades should be allowed? 
We recommend that management plans be used as the main mechanism 
to define the rules and conditions under which trades are 
allowed.  (R22)   61
Elsewhere in this report, we draw attention to the need to introduce 
mechanisms that will enable the Board to efficiently and equitably keep the 
sum of allocations less than the PAV for any management area.  A number of 
areas are already over-allocated and in many others it is likely that current 
PAV estimates are wrong.  As indicated in the State Water Plan, and in global 
experience, the only known way to do this is to meter water use.  Moreover, 
trading systems built on a mixture of volumetric and area based systems are 
plagued with problems.  For these reasons, we recommend that trading be 
allowed only among volumetric licences.  Any person who wishes to buy or 
have temporary access to an Area (Site) Taking Allocation, or a Area (Mobile) 
Taking Allocation should be required to first convert their licence and the 
licence that is to be traded, to a volumetric licence. 
In a few areas, applications for water during the pro-rata roll-out in the 
unconfined aquifer have been less than that which was available.  As a result, 
some management areas may have significant quantities of unallocated 
water.  As an interim strategy, we recommend that none of this water be 
allocated on anything other than an annual basis. Release of this water 
should occur only via a market process.  At the management area level, this 
decision should be reconsidered only after all issues associated with crop 
area ratios, over-allocation and estimation of PAVs have been resolved. 
Trading arrangements 
The Board can and should begin the process of short listing and then 
selecting a preferred broker.  During the short listing process, attention should 
be given to the range of market clearing mechanisms offered.  The option of 
selecting different brokers for the northern and southern parts of the South 
East should not be ruled out.  
We continue to emphasise the advantages of separating allocation and 
access rights, then allowing markets for each of them to evolve.  We also 
draw attention to the advantages of establishing water accounts and reducing 
the costs of trading.  
Management Plans 
The intention under the Water Resources Act is that Management Plans be 
used as the means to stipulate arrangements that are Management Area or 
Prescribed Wells Area specific.  This is consistent with World Best Practice 
and we see no advantage in changing the arrangement.  From a trading 
perspective, we recommend that management plans should: 
a.  Identify where cross-management area border trading may be trialed 
and how the impacts of these trials should be monitored; 
b.  Document interim PTUC and propose a process for their revision;   62
c.  Define annual PAV and, where appropriate18, set in place a 
transitional arrangement to bring the sum of allocations in line with 
the PAV 
d.  Set maximum and minimum depth to groundwater levels, salinity 
concentrations, etc that if exceeded would trigger a review 
e.  Define access rules including the factors to be considered when 
applying the "4 kilometre square test"; 
f.  Define the show cause rules that would apply to people whose 
licences are creating a shadow on the water use opportunities 
available to others; 
g.  Define the maximum amount of water that may be carried forward 
from year to year; 
h.  Set a time frame for the roll-out of meters; (R23) 
Administrative and legislative opportunities to enhance trading  
While the Board has responsibility for development of draft management 
plans and regional water trading policies, the Department of Water Resources 
maintains the licensing system that facilitates trades.  As the Department is in 
the process of reviewing and improving the licensing system, this report is 
timely.  Our brief examination of the Act suggests that it is probably possible 
to implement most, if not all, the recommendations proposed in this report, 
although in some cases the processes needed to achieve them would be 
complex and in-efficient.19  Opportunities to maximise economic development 
and to protect the groundwater resources of the South East, would be much 
greater if the Water Resources Act and associated Regulations are amended 
to allow: 
•  The development of a water accounting system with a low-cost cheque 
like trading system; 
•  Separation of water allocations from access rights; 
•  Replacement of an existing licence with one which defines an area right in 
volumetric or share terms 
                                            
18   If shares are introduced this is not necessary. 
19   We do not think that it is possible under the Water Resources Act 1997, to temporarily 
trade a water (Holding) allocation, to convert a water licence with a taking allocation into a 
water licence with a holding allocation, or to introduce a zero revenue auction (where all 
licence holders give up some water).  We also do not think it is possible for the Minister to 
replace an existing licence with another that, for example, converts an irrigation area into a 
volumetric share of the PAV.  Amendments to the Act may be required.   63
•  Issue of a volumetric allocation to a person who increases vertical 
recharge by, for example, converting a forest into a dryland pasture; 
•  Licensing of water brokers in the same manner as real estate agents and 
land conveyancers; 
•  Establishment of dealing and settlement procedures that mimic those 
used for land transactions 
•  Establishing and maintaining a central register of water licences and 
interests in them that mimics the State’s Torrens Title system; 
At an administrative level, we also observe that the array of charges being set 
by the Department discourage the adoption of efficient trading arrangements.  
By separating allocations from access conditions, and setting up a simple 
accounting system that tracks the status of each licensee’s water, trading 
costs should fall to be of similar magnitude to those associated with a normal 
banking account. 
Consultation 
Finally we note that this report raises many issues and identifies many 
opportunities that have not yet received wide discussion. 
Successful expansion of water trading requires: 
•  Strong consultation with community, other Boards and Government on the 
recommendations in this report; 
•  Use of Management Plans as the means to define and constrain trading 
opportunities 
•  Engagement with the Department of Water Resources and other Boards 
to assist them to simplify and improve administrative procedures 
•  Engagement with the Government with a view to amending the Water 
Resources Act to increase the extent of opportunities to use and develop 
the water resources of the South East; 
Our final suggestion and recommendation is that the South East be 
used as the place to develop, test and refine water trading arrangements 
in South Australia.  (R24)   64
APPENDIX  I -  ECONOMIC IMPACT OF PRIMARY INDUSTRIES AND 
WATER TRADING IN THE SOUTH EAST 
Prepared by Melissa Bright, PIRSA Rural Solutions 
The regional economy of the South East is substantially based on agriculture.  
In particular, large scale production of sheep, cereal crops, beef cattle, dairy, 
wine grapes and vegetables, particularly potatoes. 
A large proportion of agricultural production is processed within the region 
before it is exported from the region.  EconSearch Pty Ltd estimated that 
primary industries and the associated processing in 1995-96 directly 
accounted for 41 per cent in terms of value added and therefore gross 
regional product.  This activity indirectly generated a further 27 per cent of the 
region￿s economy, in total generating over two-thirds of the region￿s value 
added.  Table A1 summarises the direct and indirect impact for all primary 
industries in the region.   65
TABLE A1: TOTAL ECONOMIC IMPACT OF PRIMARY INDUSTRIES IN 
THE SOUTH EAST 
 
  Gross Value of 
Output ($m) 




Sheep 117  78 
Grains 50  27 
Beef 64  42 
Dairy 39  23 
Other Livestock  4  2 
Grapes 43  27 
Other Agriculture  100  61 
Forestry 90  53 
Meat Products  158  34 
Dairy Products  56  13 
Wine 132  43 
Other Food Products  66  19 
Wood and Paper Products  539  209 
 
TOTAL DIRECT IMPACT 
  
629 
Indirect Impact     
Trade   101 
Transport   45 
Business Services    27 
Finance   25 
Other Manufacturing    20 
Utilities   15 
Accommodation & Restaurants    15 
Communications   13 
Ownership of Dwellings    55 
Other Sectors    94 
 







Source: Regional Planning Framework for Primary Industries in the SELGA Region, PIRSA 
Sustainable Resources 
Table A2 illustrates the percentage of production attributable to irrigation in 
South Australia and Australia as a whole in 1990.  Within South Australia, the 
main crops requiring irrigation include vegetables, fruit, grapes, pastures and 
milk respectively.    66
TABLE A2: PERCENTAGE OF SOUTH EAST PRODUCTION 
ATTRIBUTABLE TO IRRIGATION - 1990 
 
Crop SA  Australia 
Apples 97  97 
Citrus 95  95 
Pears 95  95 
Apricots 95  92.9 
Vegetables 96  91 
Grapes 81.3  88.5 
Peaches 87  87 
Oilseeds 7  65.8 
Milk 51  44 
Pastures 54.5  19.8 
Sheep 1  6.6 
Wool 0.5  3.2 
Cereals 0  2.1 
Wheat 0  1.2 
Barley 0  1.2 
Cattle 0.3  0.4 
Source:   Australian Irrigation Council, Melbourne  
Using the above percentages of production attributable to irrigation and the 
value added identified in Table A1, it is estimated that irrigation in the South 
East directly accounts for over $93 million in regional value added.  Note that 
this is an estimate of the farm gate value of irrigation only.  In addition, 
industries such as paper mills and dairy processing plants utilise water (as 
illustrated in table A1 above) and contribute substantially to the regional 
economy. 
Gains from Water Trade 
There are several possible situations where gains from water trade can be 
obtained.  These include: 
  Increases in irrigation development from previously unallocated water; 
  Movements of water to higher value uses;  
  Increases in availability of water for irrigation development due to 
improvements in water use efficiency; and 
  Elimination of the ￿shadow￿ effect. 
Quite obviously, the decision to undertake water trading will only occur if the 
benefits expected to be received exceed the costs incurred.  To illustrate the 
possible benefits of water trade, a very simplified approach has been taken 
using gross margins for selected industries to measure the direct market 
benefits.  Due to the time restrictions of this project, non-market and indirect 
benefits have not been measured, although the above section provides an   67
indication of the value of flow on benefits/costs that may result from an 
expansion/contraction of primary industries in the region. 
The following sections estimate the potential gains that may occur from water 
trade.  It is possible however that some management areas are over-
allocated and there will be a reduction in the water allocation.  If such a 
situation arises it is expected that there will be a significant reduction in value 
of production in the affected areas (see Table A5 for a comparison of gross 
margins for irrigated versus non-irrigated agriculture).   
Possible Gains from Previously Unallocated Water 
The following table presents gross margins per ML estimated by Rolls and 
Botting (1998) and provides an indication of the types of gains that could be 
expected from undertaking an irrigation activity with previously unallocated 
water. 
Table A3: Gross Margins per ML of Water Used in Selected Agricultural 
Activities 
 
Primary Industry  Gross Margin per Mega Litre 
Meat from Pasture   140 
Lucerne Seed  360 
Subterranean Clover Seed  400 
Milk from Pasture  750 
Potatoes 820 
White Wine Grapes  3,500 
Red Wine Grapes  4,900 
Source: John Rolls and David Botting (1998) 
Possible Gains from Movements of Water to Higher Valued Uses 
There are clearly some very large gains in to the region to be made from 
water trading.  For example, using the gross margins in Table A3 above, 
Table A4 suggests that by trading one ML of water currently used for meat 
from pasture to red wine grapes, an extra $4,760 could be obtained.   68
Table A4: Possible Gains from Trading Water to Higher Value Uses in 
dollars per ML 
 




















220 260  610  680 3,360  4,760 
Lucerne Seed    40  390  460 3,140  4,540 
Subterranean 
Clover Seed 
   350  420 3,100  4,500 
Milk from Pasture        70 2,750  4,150 
Potatoes       2,680  4,080 
White Wine 
Grapes 
       1,400 
Source: John Rolls and David Botting (1998) 
However, there are several constraints on the applicability of the above 
scenarios.  Trading gains will vary hundred by hundred and management 
area by management area depending on many factors such as suitable soil 
types, climate, typography and water quality. 
An important scenario missing from the above table is the movement from 
dryland agriculture to one of the irrigation options.  There is little information 
on the gross margins of irrigated versus non-irrigated crops.  However, the 
following gross margins (see Table A5) are available from the Farm Business 
Planner (1999) which provides an interesting indication of the magnitude of 
difference between predominantly irrigated agriculture and non-irrigated 
agriculture (see Table A2 for percentage of production attributable to irrigation 
for each activity).   69
Table A5: Gross Margin per Hectare for Selected Agriculture Industries 
 
  Gross Margin per Hectare 
NON-IRRIGATED AGRICULTURE   
Wheat (ASW) $176 
Barley (Schooner) $222 





Shiraz Grapes ($750/t) $7,441 
Source: Farm Business Planner 
While Table A4 highlights the possible gains from trade, as mentioned above, 
the decision to trade will also depend on the associated costs of trading.  
Aside from the administrative costs of trading, many of the changes above 
may involve significant levels of capital investment.  Some of these costs can 
be prohibitively high.  For example, it is estimated that the development costs 
of a shiraz vineyard in the South East is nearly $30,000 per hectare (Farm 
Business Planner, 1999).  Trading will allow movement of water to those 
people who are best able to source such capital. 
Possible Gains from Improvements in Water Use Efficiency 
Improvements in water use efficiency will increase the amount of water 
available for other irrigation developments.  The best way to illustrate the 
potential benefits from improvements of water use efficiency is by way of 
example. 
Consider two irrigators, one is a potato grower (Irrigator A) and the other 
produces lucerne seed (Irrigator B).  Assume the lucerne seed producer 
improves his/her water use efficiency by 20 per cent, raising the gross margin 
per megalitre to $450 (from $360).  Assume that the lucerne seed grower is 
constrained by land availability to undertake further irrigation development.  
The irrigator therefore has 200 ML available for trade.     70









Current Situation     
Irrigator A  1,000   0  820  820,000 
Irrigator B  1,000  0  360  360,000 
    1,180,000 
Allowing Trade      
Irrigator A  1,000  +200  820  984,000 
Irrigator B  1,000  -200  450  360,000 
    1,344,000 
Net Benefits from Trade    164,000 
Trading the 200 ML to a potato grower will result in a net benefit of $164,000. 
Possible Gains from Eliminating ￿Shadows￿ 
It is possible that the existence of ￿shadows￿ currently constrains significant 
irrigation development in the South East.  To illustrate the potential benefits of 
eliminating the effect of shadows the following example has been developed. 
Consider three irrigators, one potato grower (Irrigator A), one lucerne-seed 
producer (Irrigator B) and another grower interested in growing white wine 
grapes (Irrigator C).  Assume that the white wine development is within the 
16 kilometre area of the lucerne seed producer.  Under the current situation, 
even if the lucerne seed producer leases his/her water allocation to the potato 
grower, the white wine grape development is unable to be undertaken.  
With the separation of the water right and water use property rights, the 
lucerne seed grower is still able to trade his/her water to the potato grower 
and he/she is also able to lease his/her water right to the white wine grower.  
The development is therefore able to go ahead and 1,000 ML will be obtained 
by the grape grower from the water market.   71









Current Situation     
Irrigator A  1,000   +1,000  820  1,640,000 
Irrigator B  1,000  -1,000  360  0 
Irrigator  C  0 0 0 0 
    1,640,000 
Separating into Two Property Rights    
Irrigator A  1,000  +1,000  820  1,640,000 
Irrigator B  1,000  -1,000  450  0 
Irrigator C    +1,000  3,500  3,500,000 
    5,140,000 
Net Benefits from Trade    3,500,000 
 
Assuming 1,000 ML is brought into the area, eliminating the effect of the 
￿shadow￿ will result in a net benefit of $3,500,000. 
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APPENDIX II - LESSONS ON WATER TRADING FROM AUSTRALIA AND 
ABROAD 
Based on a literature review by Henning Bjornlund, University of South 
Australia. 
Formal functioning markets in water exist in Australia, Southern and Western 
United States, Chile, Spain and Mexico.  Informal water markets have 
developed in India and Pakistan though these markets are technically against 
the law (Meinzen-Dick, 1998; Saleth, 1998, Shah, 1993). 
Experience from around the world has accumulated and we can spread these 
examples along a continuum of what has worked and what really hasn￿t. 
However, there are no perfect examples that can be easily adopted as 
institutions and rules evolve within a particular political and cultural context.  
Chile is an interesting example.  In 1981, Chile introduced a system of 
transferable water rights expressed as shares of river flow that are converted 
to volumetric equivalencies.  When river flows are severely reduced, then 
users￿ rights are reduced proportionately.  Chile has been quite successful in 
keeping transactions cost relatively low by good organisation and flow 
metering throughout valleys such as the Limari Valley (Hearne, 1998). 
In Mexico, an institutional framework has evolved that has encouraged robust 
markets within water use associations but trades are almost unheard of 
outside the association.  In order for a trade to occur outside an area, all 
members of the association must agree, the government must approve and 
the proceeds flow to the water use organisation (Rosengrant and Binswanger, 
1994; Salinas-Leon, 1994).  As a result there are very few trades outside a 
district.  Access to water limits the economic development that could have 
otherwise occurred.  
Reducing Transaction Costs 
Transaction costs are the costs that are incurred related to the trade.  It 
includes the value of time, fees and charges and the general hassle endured 
by the buyer and seller as part of undertaking the trade.  There are numerous 
examples from around the world of markets where very few transactions 
occur because of excessive transaction costs. 
i.  Simplifying the Approval Process 
In Utah and New Mexico, the office of the State Engineer determines whether 
a transfer will have adverse effects on others (Howe, 1998).  The approval 
process is considerably faster and simpler than in states where the judiciary 
settles disputes and which have rules depending on defining traditional 
consumptive use.  If disputes wind up in the courts, then trading ￿drys up￿ 
(MacDonnell, 1990). 
ii. Defining Property Rights 
In the state of Arizona, water rights are not separate from land and as a 
result, cities such as Tuscon and Phoenix have bought irrigated land and 
transported the water the city (Colby and Bush, 1987).  The cost represents a   73
huge waste of resources.  South Australia has done a lot of things right in the 
Water Resources Act 1997, water ranching is not necessary. 
New South Wales has issued a white paper on water reform and the State 
has draft legislation that is waiting to be passed.  The legislation represents 
an innovative package of water rights with a variety of security levels 
associated with water rights.  Features of this report include a plan to roll-out 
shares across the State and to separate this right to receive periodic 
allocations from the access right. 
Current thinking in the United States is moving towards the privatisation of 
aquifers (Anderson, 1997).  The property rights can be further refined to allow 
for the right holder to have a share in the long term mean annual recharge 
(flow right) and a share of the estimated stock of water (stock right). 
Uncertainty regarding rights ￿ whether real or perceived can severely limit 
permanent trade in water which is often a prerequisite for large investments 
and economic development. 
Experiences from California clearly indicates that during periods of relative 
abundance of supply, communities find that the cost of introducing the 
property rights regime with the associated metering and accounting systems, 
are found to be excessively high. As scarcity increases conflicts over water 
rights issues escalate and the costs of solving the problem increases, the 
process takes long, and causes greater community animosity (Anderson, 
1997).  
Accounting System 
Best practice in water accounting￿ you start with a water right that is defined 
as a proportional share in the water in the aquifer.  Ideally the water account 
should work like a chequing account with an opening balance that consists of 
the share of the available stock of water and the share of the recharge.  
Actual use or selling water is a direct debit.  Buying water increases your 
balance.  Excess use can be penalised by an extra debit to the account. Such 
an accounting system has operated in an aquifer in Switzerland since 1978 
(Anderson, 1997). The Minister can revise the available total stock of water if 
unexpected problems crop up later.  The individual￿s water right is unaffected. 
Importance of Metering 
The enforcement and policing of rights is very important.  In groundwater 
systems, excessive pumping leads to increased costs for everyone as well as 
environmental damage. The international literature is adamant in promoting 
metering as an essential prerequisite for water market systems (Anderson, 
1997; Shah, 1993; Griffin, 1998) 
Competitive Markets 
i.  Number of Buyers and Sellers 
From India, Pakistan, and the US we obtain clear lessons about the 
importance of large numbers of buyers and sellers.  If there is only one seller   74
in an area and a large number of small buyers, then too little water at too high 
a price will be provided.  Monopolistic behaviour has been eliminated by 
extending piping systems so that water could be moved from other tubewells 
(Shah, 1993). 
ii.  Diversity 
The larger the trading area, the more diverse the water users, and the more 
developed the network of market facilitators, the more efficient the market will 
operate and the more beneficial the outcome of trade (Gardner, 1985; Brown 
et al., 1982). 
iii. Simulating competitive markets 
Double auctions or Bulletin Board Water Banks are thought to be the ￿state of 
the art￿ in getting to competitive prices.  With a double auction process buyers 
and sellers post their bids and there can be various rules about when and 
how. This system operates within Murray Irrigation Limited.  Sealed bid 
double auctions involve buyers and sellers submitting bids and offers and the 
price is determined by this process. This system operates within the Goulburn 
Murray Irrigation District.  
iv. Water Banks in the US 
Water Banks have developed within a number of western states (MacDonnell 
et al, 1994). The longest serving bank is in Idaho and the best know is 
California￿s Emergency Drought Water Bank (Carter et al, 1994; Dixon et al, 
1993). The California Bank sets both the purchase and the sales price based 
on farm budgets with some profit incentives for sellers (Howe, 1997). The 
Idaho Bank sets prices to approximate the sellers￿ financial obligations with 
no profit (Thompson, 1997). Both banks prioritize buyers and the California 
Bank also determines what water can be deposited in the bank. They 
therefore do not represent a normal market, where willing buyers and sellers 
exchange goods at agreed prices. They do however, facilitate sales of large 
volumes of water, in periods of extreme shortage, by providing a smooth and 
fast transfer process. 
Access to Information 
Experience from within Australia (NSW and Goulburn-Murray Irrigation 
District) suggests that prices tend to be stable, when there is a public register 
of information on prices paid.  Wide fluctuations due to thin markets 
represents another source of risk. 
Impact on Neighbours 
Excessive pumping can cause a cone of depression allowing an infusion of 
saline water.  As mentioned above monitoring and enforcement has to occur.  
Problems can be avoided by requiring buyers to put farm plans in place that 
show how irrigation and drainage infrastructure will be introduced to prevent 
these problems.   75
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